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ABSTRACT
BRETT MATSUMOTO: Estimating Models of Learning in Individual Decision making with an
Application to Youth Smoking.
(Under the direction of Donna Gilleskie)
In the first chapter of my dissertation, I examine the dynamics of youth smoking behavior using
a model of rational addiction with learning. Individuals in the model face uncertainty regarding the
parameters that determine their utility from smoking. Through experimentation, individuals learn
about how much they enjoy smoking cigarettes as well as the effects of reinforcement, tolerance, and
withdrawal. The addition of learning to the dynamic optimization problem of adolescents provides
an explanation for the experimentation of the non-smoker. I estimate the parameters of the model
using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 and compare the overall fit of the
model to the model without learning. The estimated model is also used to analyze the effect of
cigarette taxes and anti-smoking policies. I find that the model with learning is better able to fit the
observed data and that cigarette taxes are not only effective in reducing the level of youth smoking,
but can even increase welfare for some individuals.
In the second chapter (with Jonathan James), we show how the conditional choice probability
(CCP) estimation procedure of Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) can be extended to feasibly estimate
structural learning models. Although the focus of the paper is the specific application to learning
models, the procedure could be used to estimate any model with continuous unobserved hetero-
geneity. Monte-Carlo simulations show that the CCP method can provide significant computational
savings relative to Simulated Maximum Likelihood.
In the third chapter (with Forrest Spence), we investigate whether an individual’s subjective price
beliefs reflect the empirical distribution of prices and whether an individual learns about features of
the price distribution through experience in the market. We use data on subjective price beliefs from
a survey of 1,224 college students, and find that inexperienced individuals tend to expect online
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prices to be higher than what is observed empirically. However, consumers with more experience in
the marketplace generally have more accurate beliefs about the price distribution, which is consistent
with learning.
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CHAPTER 1
EXPLAINING YOUTH SMOKING INITIATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A RATIONAL
ADDITION MODEL WITH LEARNING
1.1 Introduction
Despite its historically low level in the U.S., cigarette smoking remains a major public health
concern. The Surgeon General estimates that tobacco use causes approximately 480,000 deaths per
year in the United States and is estimated to cause between $289-332.5 billion in economic costs
(USDHHS 2013).1 Tobacco use is the leading preventable cause of death, yet people continue to
smoke despite the high level of public awareness of its adverse health effects. Because cigarettes
are addictive, it may be easier to discourage smoking initiation than to encourage smoking cessa-
tion. Also, cigarette manufacturers have historically targeted their advertisements to young people
in the hopes of cultivating lifelong customers. Among adults who become daily smokers, approxi-
mately 90 percent smoke for the first time before age 18 (USDHHS 2012). For these reasons, policy
interventions aimed at reducing the level of smoking in the population often target young people.
The decision to engage in a harmful addictive behavior, such as smoking, seemingly presents
a problem for standard economic models. Consuming a harmful addictive substance would be an
irrational act for a forward-looking utility-maximizing agent. The Rational Addiction (RA) model
of Becker and Murphy (1988) shows that consumption of an addictive substance can be explained
using the standard economic framework. Their explanation of addictive behavior centers around the
concept that past utilization of addictive goods impacts current utility from consumption of these
goods. A major criticism of the Becker and Murphy model is the implication that individuals are
always acting optimally, so addicts do not regret their decision to consume the addictive good. In
1Economic costs include direct medical costs in addition to the lost productivity attributable to smoking related
illnesses. Estimates are for the years 2009-2012.
their model addiction is not a problem or even an undesirable outcome, so there is no place for policy
intervention to treat or prevent addiction. Empirical evidence suggests that many individuals regret
their decision to smoke. Approximately 70% of adult smokers wish to quit smoking entirely and
over half have attempted to quit smoking in the past year (NHIS, 2010).
Another limitation of the RA model as a model of youth smoking behavior is that it treats smok-
ing initiation as exogenous. In this paper, I extend the RA model so that it is better able to explain the
individual’s smoking initiation decision. Specifically, I relax the assumption of perfect information
in the RA model by incorporating learning about one’s preferences. The parameters that determine
the utility one receives from smoking are initially unknown, but the individual has beliefs about their
true value. As an individual experiments with smoking, he receives utility signals and updates his
beliefs. The addition of uncertainty and learning to the optimization problem of adolescents pro-
vides an explanation for the experimentation of the non-smoker and allows for the possibility that
an individual who starts to smoke may later regret that decision. Therefore, policies that prevent an
individual from experimenting with cigarettes may be welfare improving as the individual would be
prevented from making a decision he may later regret.
The main purpose of this paper is to quantify the effectiveness of anti-smoking policies and to
evaluate the resulting impact on individual welfare. In order to do this, I recover the policy-invariant
utility function parameters of a rational addiction model with learning by fitting a dynamic discrete
choice model of optimal smoking decision making to the observed data. As the first attempt to
estimate the structural parameters of a rational addiction model with learning about preferences, this
research allows for empirical testing of the perfect information assumption in the RA model (i.e., the
assumption that individuals know their utility function parameters). I estimate the model parameters
using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97).
Estimation of the parameters of a dynamic discrete choice model is generally computationally
intensive as each iteration over the parameter space requires re-solving the dynamic optimization
problem. The inclusion of uncertainty and learning over multiple parameters further complicates
estimation of the model. To circumvent these computational issues, I use the Expectation Maxi-
mization (EM) algorithm in conjunction with Conditional Choice Probability (CCP) estimation and
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Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the model parameters. The estimation procedure provides a sig-
nificant computational advantage, which allows for the estimation of a more complex model than is
feasible using full-solution techniques.
Preliminary estimation results demonstrate that allowing for uncertainty and learning in a dy-
namic model of youth smoking significantly improves the overall fit of the model. Results from
counterfactual policy simulations suggest that policies that impact individuals’ initial beliefs about
their utility function parameters are effective in reducing youth smoking. Taxes are also shown to
be effective in reducing the level of smoking. The estimated model predicts that a doubling of the
price of cigarettes would reduce the prevalence of youth smoking by 12.3% and adult smoking by
12.6%. An increase in the legal purchasing age from 18 to 19 years old would decrease youth smok-
ing by 21.7%. However, there would be no effect on adult smokers as the higher legal purchasing
age would only cause a delay in smoking initiation. The results of the welfare analysis show that
increasing cigarette taxes would only lead to a relatively small loss in total welfare as the welfare
gains to keeping those who would later regret the decision to smoke from starting to smoke offset
the loss of welfare from smokers having to pay a higher price for cigarettes.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section
3 presents the model. Section 4 discusses the data. Section 5 develops the estimation routine. The
estimation results are presented in section 6, and section 7 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
Becker and Murphy (1988) developed the RA model to show that seemingly irrational behavior
could be explained using a standard economic framework of a forward-looking utility-maximizing
agent. The model’s welfare implications have caused many to abandon the general framework of the
RA model and to develop “irrational” models to explain the time inconsistency of addictive behavior.
These alternative theoretical models generally feature dual-states of the world or individuals with
dual-selves.2 Addiction results when an individual is in an addictive state of the world or if the
behavior of the individual is being controlled by the self that is more prone to addiction.
2Papers that use the dual-state approach include Winston (1980) and Bernheim and Rangel (2004). Papers that use
the dual-self approach include Thaler and Shefrin (1981) and Benabou and Tirole (2004).
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Other models of the consumption of addictive goods generate time-inconsistent behavior by de-
viating from the standard assumptions regarding how future utility is discounted. The simplest devia-
tion is the myopic model. A myopic individual completely discounts future utility and only considers
the current period’s utility when making decisions. Other deviations from the standard assumptions
regarding time preferences include an endogenous discount factor (Orphanides and Zervos 1998) or
hyperbolic discounting (Gruber and Koszegi 2001). Finally, Orphanides and Zervos (1995) argue
that the problem with the RA model is not the assumption of a rational, forward-looking agent but
the assumption of perfect information. An individual in their model can be one of two types (addict
or not an addict). The individual learns which type he is if he consumes the addictive good. The
model estimated in this paper is an extension of the theoretical model proposed by Orphanides and
Zervos (1995).
The RA model assumes that individuals are forward-looking, and there have been many studies
that attempt to test the validity of this assumption empirically in the context of consumer demand
for an addictive good. The evidence is generally consistent with forward looking behavior (Becker,
Grossman, and Murphy 1994; Chaloupka 1991).3 One of the limitations of the empirical addiction
literature is that papers primarily attempt to compare the rational addiction model to the myopic
model. No work (of which the author is aware) has been done to estimate alternative models or
to empirically test the other assumptions of the RA model. Most of the literature involves reduced
form estimation, but a few papers have estimated the structural parameters of an addiction model
(Arcidiacono, Sieg, and Sloan 2007; Choo 2000; Gordon and Sun 2009; Darden 2011).4
Much of the analysis in the economics literature of policy interventions on youth smoking has
focused on cigarette taxes. The rational addiction framework implies that individuals who are not
currently consuming the addictive good should be more responsive to changes in the price of that
good than current users. Many studies have found a significant effect of taxes on smoking initiation.
Some studies, however, have found that cigarette taxes have little to no significant effect on youth
3See Chaloupka and Warner (2000) for a thorough summary of the empirical literature.
4There is a learning component to the life-cycle model of Darden (2011), but the learning is over the health effects of
smoking. Individuals are assumed to know their preferences (i.e., utility function parameters).
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smoking initiation (DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios 2002; DeCicca, Kenkel, Mathios, Shin, and Lim
2008; Emery, White, and Pierce 2001). Importantly, some of the studies in this literature find that
nonsmokers are more price sensitive than smokers while also controlling for unobserved heterogene-
ity (Fletcher, Deb, and Sindelar 2009; Gilleskie and Strumpf 2005). Finally, some studies have found
that taxes merely delay smoking initiation rather than prevent people from becoming smokers (Glied
2002). There have been fewer papers that examine the effect of other anti-smoking policies on youth
smoking and the results have been mixed (Tworek, Yamaguchi, Dloska, Emery, Barker, Giovino,
O’Malley, and Chaloupka 2010).5
One of the main applications of learning models in economics is in the area of consumer learn-
ing from experience goods (Erdem and Keane 1996; Ackerberg 2003).6 These models estimate the
learning process involved when consumers purchase unfamiliar goods. The consumer learns about
the utility he receives from consuming these goods and updates his beliefs each time the good is
consumed. This paper fits into the structural learning literature because the utility that the individual
receives from consuming an addictive good is initially unknown and is learned over time if the indi-
vidual consumes the addictive good. This paper extends the standard models used by incorporating
the unique features of consuming an addictive good.
1.3 Model
This section sets up the individual’s decision problem regarding optimal smoking behavior. An
individual receives utility from consuming cigarettes as well as the consumption of other goods. In
order to incorporate the features of consuming an addictive good, the individual’s utility in the cur-
rent period also depends on past levels of smoking in a manner consistent with the scientific literature
on addiction (Laviolette and van der Kooy 2004; Nestler and Aghajanain 1997). Past consumption
of the addictive good affects current utility through reinforcement, which occurs when the marginal
utility of smoking is increasing in the level of past smoking. As the body becomes accustomed to
consuming an addictive substance, larger quantities of the substance must be consumed to achieve
5For an overview of the effectiveness of anti-smoking legislation in general, see Goel and Nelson (2006).
6See Ching, Erdem, and Keane (2011) for an overview of the empirical economic applications of learning models.
5
a similar effect. This physical transition is referred to as developing tolerance. Habitual use of an
addictive good also generates physical dependence. As a result, the individual experiences adverse
effects from attempting to lower the level of consumption of the addictive good. This transition
may result in a withdrawal effect. Withdrawal is modeled as an asymmetric adjustment cost, i.e.
a cost associated with decreasing the amount consumed.7 These effects are parameterized in the
model (ρ, τ , and ω for reinforcement, tolerance, and withdrawal respectively), the magnitude of
these effects depends on the level of past smoking, and these parameters vary across individuals.
For certain combinations of these individual specific parameter values, the combined effect of re-
inforcement, tolerance, and withdrawal generates adjacent complementarity in the consumption of
cigarettes. Adjacent complementarity, which Becker and Murphy (1988) use as the defining charac-
teristic of addiction, occurs when current consumption of a good is increasing in past consumption.
1.3.1 Utility
Each year, individual n makes an annual smoking decision and chooses his level of smoking
from a discrete set of alternatives, aj ∈ {a1, a2, . . . , aJ}, which reflect the average daily cigarette
consumption during the year. The decision not to smoke is represented by the level of smoking a1.
The price of a single cigarette in period t is denoted pt. The addictive stock is denoted as Snt and
is defined as the level of smoking in the prior year.8 The contemporaneous utility associated with
alternative j > 1 for individual n at time t if the individual did not smoke in the previous period
(Snt = 0) is:
ujnt =
(
αn + ξjXnt
)
z(aj)− γnptaj + jn (1.1)
where  is a vector of independent and identically distributed alternative-specific preference shocks
that follow a Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distribution. The utility from smoking depends
7This approach of explicitly modeling withdrawal effects as asymmetric adjustment costs to achieve adjacent com-
plementarity in a rational addiction model was developed by Suranovic, Goldfarb, and Leonard (1999).
8This definition of the addictive stock implies full depreciation which is justified by the frequency of the smoking
decision. Future versions of this paper will test whether the parameter estimates of the model change if this assumption
is relaxed.
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upon the individual-specific match parameter αn, demographic variables (Xnt), the level of smok-
ing through the function z(a) (explained below), and the expenditure on smoking (which depends
on both the price of cigarettes and level of smoking). The parameter γn measures the individual’s
sensitivity to the price of cigarettes and is a function of age, work status, and income.9 Addition-
ally, the individual’s demographic variables affect utility by imposing additional costs or benefits on
different levels of smoking. If a variable only affects the utility of smoking versus not smoking and
does not affect the decision of how much to smoke conditional on smoking, then the coefficient ξj
will be constant for j > 1. Variables in this category include the individual’s race or religion. These
variables may affect the social acceptance of smoking within the individual’s culture. Variables that
potentially affect utility differently for different levels of smoking could include whether the indi-
vidual is under 18 years of age or whether the individual has older siblings. These variables were
shown to be significant in the smoking decision of young people in Gilleskie and Strumpf (2005).
If the individual has a positive level of smoking stock (i.e., Snt > 0) then the utility for alternative
j > 1 is:
ujnt =
(
αn + ρng(Snt) + ξjXnt
)
z(aj)− τnSnt − ωnq(aj, Snt)1[aj < Snt]− γnptaj + jnt (1.2)
The addictive stock affects the marginal utility of smoking through the reinforcement, tolerance, and
withdrawal terms. The reinforcement effect, ρg(S), increases the marginal utility of smoking for
every positive level of smoking. The tolerance effect, τS, enters current period utility for positive
levels of past and current consumption and decreases the utility associated with each positive level of
smoking. The adjustment cost or withdrawal cost, ωq(a, S), only enters the current period’s utility
when the individual reduces his consumption from one period to the next. The utility of not smoking
(j = 1) is normalized to only include the withdrawal term (if Snt > 0) and the preference shock.
The functions z, g, and q have the following properties:
1. z′(a) > 0, z′′(a) < 0, lima→0 z′(a) <∞
9The utility from consuming one’s entire income in other goods is normalized to zero.
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2. g(0) = 0, g′(Snt) > 0, g′′(Snt) < 0
3. q(aj, Snt) ≥ 0 for all aj ≤ Snt and q(aj, Snt) = 0 if aj = Snt
The assumptions on the function z allow for a corner solution since the marginal utility from smok-
ing is finite when the individual chooses not to smoke. The function q, which is a component of
the withdrawal effect, is also assumed to be increasing in the size of the decrease in smoking from
one period to the next. The functions g and q allow the reinforcement and withdrawal effects to
be nonlinear.10 The Estimation section discusses the specific functional forms used. The individ-
ual’s smoking preference parameters are θn = (αn ρn τn ωn)′. The parameter αn determines the
individual’s match quality for smoking. The parameters ρn, τn, and ωn correspond to the effects of
reinforcement, tolerance and withdrawal, respectively. The parameters in θn vary across individuals
and are jointly normally distributed in the population: θn ∼ N(θ¯,Σ).
1.3.2 Timing
The individual does not initially know the value of his smoking preference parameters (θn). He
makes an annual smoking decision based on his beliefs about the parameters. At the start of the
period, the individual observes prices, government tobacco policies, demographic variables (X),
and the alternative specific preference shock. Then, the individual chooses a level of smoking and
receives a utility signal. The individual uses this signal to update his beliefs at the end of the period.
An individual who has never smoked before the current period faces a sequential smoking de-
cision within the period, where he first decides whether to experiment with smoking before making
a smoking consumption decision for the year. The consumer learning literature generally finds that
learning about match quality occurs relatively quickly. Since it would not take a full year to learn the
match quality parameter α, an individual who has never smoked must first decide whether to exper-
iment with smoking. Let aE denote the level of consumption associated with experimentation. If he
chooses to experiment, he learns his true value of α and proceeds to make a smoking decision for the
rest of the period. If he chooses not to experiment, his smoking consumption for the period is zero
and he will face the experimentation decision again in the next period. In periods after the individual
10The tolerance term could also be allowed to be nonlinear in S.
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experiments, the only decision is about annual smoking consumption. The utility of experimenting
is:
uEnt = (αn + ξ
EXnt)z(a
E)− γptaE + Ent (1.3)
The utility shock for experimenting is assumed to be from a Type I Extreme Value distribution. For
the sequential decision, individuals observe the preference shock for experimenting at the start of the
period but do not observe the preference shock for the smoking decision until after they experiment.
1.3.3 Beliefs and Learning over the Utility Function Parameters
The individual’s initial prior beliefs are denoted as θn,0 ∼ N(mn,0,Σn,0). Assuming Rational
Expectations, the mean and variance of the individual’s initial prior beliefs equal the population
mean and variance of θ.11
The individual updates his beliefs according to a Bayesian learning process based on the signals
received. After experimenting, the individual learns his true value of α. Without loss of generality,
assume that the individual first experiments with the addictive good in period 0. The initial prior for
the period 0 consumption decision is the initial prior distribution conditional on the realized value
of α. Let mn,0|αn and Σn,0|αn denote the mean and covariance matrix of the initial prior distribution
conditional on α = αn. This conditional distribution becomes the initial prior distribution for the
subsequent learning over the parameters ρ, τ , and ω.
In every period that an individual chooses to smoke, he receives utility signals about the value of
the reinforcement and tolerance parameters. If the individual reduces his level of smoking in period
t from the level in period t − 1, he receives a signal for the withdrawal parameter. For the level of
smoking aj and past smoking {Snl}tl=0, the signals are as follows:
δnt =

(ρn + λnt)1[aj > 0] λnt ∼ i.i.d. N(0, σ
2
λ
aj(1+g(Snt))
)
(τn + ψnt)1[aj > 0] ψnt ∼ i.i.d. N(0, σ
2
ψ
1+Snt
)
(ωn + ηnt)1[aj < Snt] ηnt ∼ i.i.d. N(0, σ
2
η
Snt−aj )
(1.4)
11Some restriction on the initial prior beliefs is required for identification. It may be possible to introduce heterogeneity
in the initial priors by allowing the parameters of the initial prior beliefs to vary by observable characteristics.
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The variation in the observed signal around its true value is assumed to be uncorrelated with the
other parameters. The accuracy of the reinforcement signal is proportional to the quantity consumed
as well as the level of past consumption, which implies that individuals face a trade-off between the
speed of learning and the risk of becoming addicted. The accuracy of the tolerance signal is greater
for higher levels of past consumption, and the accuracy of the withdrawal signal increases with larger
decreases in consumption. The individual uses this utility signal to update his beliefs about his true
parameters. I assume that the individual is able to distinguish between the signals if multiple signals
are received in a given period and that the signal noises are uncorrelated (conditional on aj and Snt).
The individual’s posterior beliefs at the end of period t after choosing a level of smoking equal
to aj (i.e., the individual’s beliefs after receiving the signals associated with the smoking decision)
are:
θn,t+1|α ∼ N(mn,t+1|α,Σn,t+1|α) (1.5)
where
mn,t+1|α = Σ−1n,t+1|α(Σ
−1
n,t+1|αmnt|α + Φ
−1
nt δnt) (1.6)
Σn,t+1|α = (Σ−1nt|α + Φ
−1
nt Bnt)
−1 (1.7)
Φ−1nt =

aj(1+g(Snt))
σ2λ
0 0
0 1+Snt
σ2ψ
0
0 0
Snt−aj
σ2η
 (1.8)
Bnt =

1[aj > 0] 0 0
0 1[aj > 0] 0
0 0 1[aj < Snt]
 (1.9)
Equations (1.6) and (1.7) are the updating equations for the mean and variance of the individual’s
beliefs. The updated mean is a weighted average of the prior mean and the signal, where the weights
are the precision (inverse of the variance) of the prior and the signal. Φ is a diagonal matrix of the
signal precision, and B is a diagonal matrix with indicators for a given signal being received. As
the individual receives more signals, the precision of his beliefs increases. Since the signals are
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unbiased, the individual’s beliefs converge to the true parameter values.
Note that even though the signal noises are uncorrelated, the learning process for each param-
eter is not independent of the learning process for the other parameters. Since the parameters are
correlated in the population and the population covariance matrix is the variance of the individual’s
initial prior beliefs, there is correlation in the learning process among the parameters. Even if the
individual never receives a withdrawal signal, his beliefs about the value of his withdrawal parameter
will change as he receives more information about the value of his other parameters.
1.3.4 Expectation of Future Prices, Policies, and State Variables
There are two components of the retail price of cigarettes: the manufacturer’s price of the product
and state and federal excise taxes. Determinants of the price of the product include the price of
tobacco, production technology, labor costs, and other costs of production and distribution. Since
surveyed individuals are not typically asked about their subjective expectations for future prices,
some assumption must be made for how individuals forecast prices. One possible specification is
to assume that the base component of the price follows a simple stochastic process (e.g., time trend
with an AR(1) error). The justification for this specification is that individuals likely have some idea
as to any time trend in the price as well as some realization that price shocks are persistent over time.
The other component of price, the excise tax, is much more difficult for the individual to forecast
because it is determined by the political system. Specifying how individuals form expectations over
other future tobacco policies presents a similar challenge. Estimates of the model presented in this
work will impose the likely unrealistic assumption of perfect foresight.12
The endogenous state variables include the individual’s beliefs and the addictive stock. The
addictive stock is defined as the prior period’s level of smoking, so the addictive stock evolves de-
terministically conditional on a particular smoking choice. The individual uses his current beliefs
about smoking preferences to evaluate the different smoking alternatives, while taking into account
the potential information that he will receive from each possible choice. The individual also has
12Other possibilities include assuming that the individual expects current tobacco taxes and policies to continue in-
definitely or that individuals form expectations regarding the frequency and magnitude of excise tax changes based upon
recent experience (i.e., a form of adaptive expectations).
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perfect foresight regarding the observed exogenous state variables in X .13
1.3.5 The Individual’s Problem
Each period, the individual chooses a level of smoking that maximizes his expected discounted
lifetime utility given his beliefs and the value of the other state variables. The individual evaluates
his expected discounted lifetime utility using backwards recursion. Let T denote the final period the
individual is observed in the data, and let djnt be an indicator variable that equals one if the individual
selects alternative j in period t. Then the value function in period T is:
VnT (SnT ,mnT ,ΣnT , XnT ) = E
[
max
j
djnT
(
uj(θnT , SnT , XnT )
+ βE[Vn,T+1(Sn,T+1,mn,T+1,Σn,T+1, Xn,T+1, Hn,T+1)|SnT ,mnT ,ΣnT , XnT , djnT = 1]
)]
(1.10)
The continuation value function VT+1 contains an additional state variable H that contains the indi-
vidual’s cumulative smoking history (i.e., total number of years smoked at each level of smoking).14
The cumulative smoking history affects the individual’s utility later in life through potential adverse
health effects of smoking. The expectation over the discounted future value term is taken with re-
spect to the future state variables. Current period utility is the expected utility given the current
period’s prior beliefs. Since the parameters in θ enter the utility function linearly, the expected utility
for the current period is just the utility evaluated using the mean of the individual’s current prior. The
value function for earlier periods can be defined recursively starting from the terminal period value
function:
Vnt(Snt,mnt,Σnt, Xnt) = E
[
max
j
djnt
(
uj(θnt, Snt, Xnt)
+ βE[Vn,t+1(Sn,t+1,mn,t+1,Σn,t+1, Xn,t+1) | Snt,mnt,Σnt, Xnt, djnt = 1]
)]
(1.11)
13For some variables, such as the individual’s age, this assumption is not unrealistic.
14The state variable H is suppressed in the value functions of earlier periods to simplify notation. Although the
cumulative history does not affect utility in earlier periods, it still impacts the individual’s behavior by changing the
discounted expected future lifetime utility in period T.
12
If the individual has never smoked prior to period t, the value function for the experimentation
decision is defined as:
V Ent (mn,0,Σn,0, Xnt) =
max
{
uEnt + Eα[Vnt(mn,0|α,Σn,0|α, 0, Xnt)] , βE[V
E
n,t+1(mn,0,Σn,0, Xn,t+1)]
}
(1.12)
The first term inside the max operator is the value from experimenting in the current period. This
term includes the utility from experimenting plus the value of the consumption decision for the cur-
rent period. The value of the consumption decision depends upon a particular realization of α, which
is unknown at the time of the experimentation decision, so the expected value of the consumption
decision is calculated by integrating over potential realizations of α. The second term inside the max
operator is the value associated with not experimenting, which is the discounted expected future
value of the next period’s experimentation decision.
The individual’s problem is to choose the optimal sequence of experimentation and consumption
in order to maximize his discounted lifetime expected utility. In the first period, the individual’s
beliefs are the initial prior beliefs and the individual has no experience with smoking.
1.4 Data
The data used to estimate the structural parameters of the model are from the NLSY97. The first
wave of the survey was conducted in 1997 and included 8,984 individuals who were born between
1980 and 1984 (age at first interview ranged from 12 to 18). Subsequent waves have been conducted
annually and are ongoing. This paper uses the first 13 waves of the data (through the 2009 wave).
There are several advantages of using this data set for the study of youth smoking initiation. First, the
individuals in the data set are surveyed at a young age during which the decision to begin smoking is
made. Second, the survey is conducted annually, which is generally the shortest interval between ob-
servations in large nationally-representative panel data sets. The learning process is better identified
with annual observations as opposed to less frequent observations.15 Finally, the questions related
15If the individuals are only observed infrequently, then it is likely that much of the uncertainty would be resolved
after a relatively small number of observations. It would be difficult to identify the dynamic learning process if the
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to smoking are asked every wave. I supplement the geocoded restricted use version of the NLSY97
data set with tobacco policy data by matching individuals with the tobacco policies in their state.
Relevant policies for this study include the cigarette excise tax, restrictions on tobacco advertising,
spending on anti-smoking policies, and indoor smoking bans.
1.4.1 Sample Selection and Attrition
In a dynamic structural model, missing choice data add additional complexity in estimation. If
an individual is in the sample, leaves, and later re-enters the sample, then the estimation routine has
to integrate over all possible sequences of choices in the missing periods to calculate the value of
the state variable when the individual re-enters the sample. One alternative is to only estimate the
model on individuals who are observed in each time period. Restricting the sample to individuals
observed in every time period avoids the difficulties in estimation, but the resulting sample may no
longer be representative of the population if attrition is non-random. Table 1.1 reports the proportion
of individuals with a given number of missing waves. Only about 60% of the original sample (5,385
of the original 8,984 individuals) is observed in every wave. Approximately 11% of this sample
has one missing observation, and an additional 10% have either two or three missing observations.
The preliminary estimation sample only includes the individuals who are observed in every wave.
An additional 598 individuals are excluded due to missing smoking, demographic, or geographic
data. The preliminary estimation sample contains the 4,787 individuals observed in every wave with
nonmissing data for the key variables.
Table 1.1: Individual Level Survey Participation
Total years missing 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7+ Total
Frequency 5,385 1,011 582 378 330 254 219 825 8,984
Percent 59.94 11.25 6.48 4.21 3.67 2.83 2.44 9.18 100
econometrician only had a few observations per individual where uncertainty and learning mattered.
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1.4.2 Data Summary and Construction of Key Variables
In the NLSY97, individuals are asked whether they have smoked since the previous interview.
If the answer is yes, the individuals are asked about their smoking behavior over the month prior
to the interview. Specifically, the question asks, “during the past 30 days, on how many days did
you smoke a cigarette?” If the answer is greater than zero, the next question asks, “when you
smoked a cigarette during the past 30 days, how many cigarettes did you usually smoke each day?” I
construct a categorical smoking variable from the answers to these two questions. The total number
of cigarettes smoked in the past month is simply the product of the answer to these two questions
and is divided by 30 to give the average number of cigarettes smoked per day. The range of possible
values for the average number of cigarettes smoked per day is divided into four intervals to create the
discrete choice variable aj . These intervals correspond to not smoking, light smoking (0-5 cigarettes
per day), moderate smoking (5-15 cigarettes per day), and heavy smoking (more than 15 cigarettes
per day).
Table 1.2: Categorical Smoking Statistics
Smoking Level
Range Frequency
Percent E[a|aj]
(cigarettes per day) (in person years)
None a1 = 0 44, 186 69.65 0
Light 0 < a2 ≤ 5 9, 714 16.50 1.63
Moderate 5 < a3 ≤ 15 5, 469 9.21 10.50
Heavy 15 < a4 2, 862 4.64 23.51
Table 1.2 reports the range of each of the intervals, the number of observations (in person years)
in each interval, and the mean of average cigarettes smoked per day conditional on being in the range
of the interval. The distribution of the average cigarettes smoked per day is skewed to the right with
the majority of the observations concentrated at the mass point of zero.
Table 1.3 reports the transition probabilities for the smoking categories. The transition proba-
bilities illustrate several key features of the data. First, individuals increase their level of smoking
gradually. Individuals are more likely to increase to the next highest level than they are to jump
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Table 1.3: Cumulative Smoking Transition Probabilities
Smoking level at t
Smoking level at t− 1 None Light Moderate Heavy
None
0.900 0.081 0.014 0.005
(36,748) (3,321) (562) (193)
Light
0.297 0.537 0.141 0.026
(2,679) (4,848) (1,269) (233)
Moderate
0.097 0.175 0.575 0.154
(482) (871) (2,862) (767)
Heavy
0.065 0.059 0.249 0.627
(169) (155) (650) (1,635)
Note: frequencies in parentheses
Table 1.4: Under 18 Smoking Transition Probabilities
Smoking level at t
Smoking level at t− 1 None Light Moderate Heavy
None 0.882 0.099 0.015 0.004
Light 0.360 0.448 0.151 0.040
Moderate 0.116 0.146 0.517 0.221
Heavy 0.076 0.093 0.271 0.559
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several levels. Also, for any given level of smoking, there is a high probability that individuals will
transition to a lower level of smoking. For light and moderate levels of smoking, the probability that
individuals decrease the amount they smoke is approximately 30%. For the heaviest smokers, this
probability is almost 40%. The amount of decreases in the level of smoking observed in the data is
difficult to reconcile with the standard RA model, but is consistent with the model of behavior that
incorporates uncertainty and learning. Table 1.4 reports the transition probabilities for individuals
under 18 years old. Relative to the full sample there is less persistence in smoking choices, with
more movement (both upward and downward) between smoking categories. This is consistent with
the learning model since it will take some experience before individuals are able to determine what
level of smoking is optimal for their specific utility function parameters.
Table 1.5 presents summary statistics for smoking behavior and demographic variables in three
of the early waves.16 Over these waves, the proportion of individuals who currently smoke increases,
however, it does fall in later waves. The other variables included in the table enter the individual’s
decision to smoke, either directly through the utility received from smoking or through the cost of
smoking. The NLSY does not ask about parent’s smoking behavior. Parental smoking behavior po-
tentially enters the individual’s smoking decision through the individual’s beliefs as well as through
the cost of smoking. Parental education and other parental characteristics could serve as a proxy for
parent smoking behavior.
Figure 1.1 presents the proportion of individuals in each smoking category by age. The propor-
tion of individuals choosing to smoke increases steadily during the teenage years, reaches a peak for
individuals in their early 20s, and declines slightly as individuals progress through their 20s. The
decline in smoking rates for individuals in their 20s is primarily due to a lower proportion of light
smokers. The proportion of moderate and heavy smokers remains relatively constant after reaching a
peak around the age of 20. Figure 1.2 presents the proportion of current smokers by gender and race.
Blacks have a substantially lower rate of smoking compared to other ethnic groups, and females have
a lower smoking rate than males.
16See the Data Appendix for summary statistics for all waves.
17
Table 1.5: Summary Statistics of Smoking and Demographic Variables in Select Years
Year
1997 1999 2001
Time-Varying Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Ever smoked 0.363 0.481 0.517 0.500 0.598 0.490
Current smoker 0.156 0.363 0.265 0.441 0.315 0.464
Number of cigarettes per day 0.541 2.559 1.618 5.064 2.368 6.135
Age 14.23 1.474 16.82 1.432 18.88 1.430
Employed 0.447 0.497 0.530 0.499 0.708 0.455
Real annual income* 247.5 762.6 1,208 3,178 3,889 6,295
Income > $20,000 0.000 0.014 0.010 0.098 0.028 0.164
Married 0.000 0.014 0.013 0.115 0.053 0.224
Any children in household 0.007 0.085 0.047 0.212 0.107 0.310
High School student 0.982 0.133 0.691 0.462 0.292 0.455
College student 0.000 0.020 0.128 0.334 0.303 0.460
High School graduate 0.001 0.035 0.240 0.427 0.605 0.489
Time-Invariant Variables
Female 0.536 0.499
Black 0.255 0.436
Father’s educ (years) 10.32 5.752
Mother’s educ (years) 11.79 4.242
* In year 2000 dollars.
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Figure 1.1: Smoking Choice Probabilities by Age
Figure 1.2: Gender and Racial Differences in Smoking Rates by Age
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1.4.3 Cigarette Prices and State Excise Tax Data
The cigarette tax and price data used in this paper are from Orzechowski and Walker’s Tax Burden
on Tobacco. The price used is a sales weighted average of the premium brand cigarettes sold in a
given year. Cigarettes are taxed at the federal and state level. In some instances they are also taxed at
the county and municipal level. The federal cigarette tax in 2011 was $1.01 per pack. The tax rates
vary considerably across states. In 2011, state cigarette taxes ranged from a low of $0.17 per pack
in Missouri to a high of $4.24 in New York. At the start of the sample period in 1997, state cigarette
taxes ranged from a low of $0.025 in Virginia to a high of $0.825 in Washington. Historically,
the states with the lowest tax rates on tobacco are the tobacco-producing states of the southeast.
From 1997-2011, only two states have had a constant tax rate, and most states have had multiple
tax increases over the period. The variation in tax rates is largely responsible for the variation in the
retail price of cigarettes across states. In 2011, the average retail price of cigarettes per pack ranged
from $4.70 in Missouri to $10.29 in New York.
Table 1.6: Summary Statistics of State Tobacco Price and Taxes
Year Real Price Real Tax (State + Federal)
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
1997 2.265 0.327 1.796 3.305 0.633 0.217 0.284 1.143
1998 2.477 0.353 2.013 3.576 0.661 0.256 0.280 1.310
1999 3.200 0.361 2.698 4.304 0.670 0.271 0.274 1.282
2000 3.318 0.393 2.777 4.512 0.760 0.279 0.365 1.450
2001 3.500 0.370 3.035 4.458 0.752 0.291 0.355 1.410
2002 3.787 0.550 3.107 5.671 0.927 0.432 0.397 1.819
2003 3.843 0.567 3.157 5.452 1.041 0.453 0.388 2.284
2004 3.815 0.615 3.088 5.343 1.064 0.515 0.378 2.598
2005 3.847 0.643 3.095 5.292 1.157 0.528 0.406 2.513
2006 3.772 0.673 2.899 5.365 1.135 0.527 0.393 2.533
2007 3.883 0.652 2.906 5.520 1.191 0.518 0.382 2.462
2008 3.896 0.737 2.893 5.687 1.244 0.579 0.368 2.511
2009 4.711 0.846 3.406 6.458 1.856 0.628 0.867 3.588
Table 1.6 present the summary statistics across the 50 states and the District of Columbia of the
real price of cigarettes as well as the real total tax. The average real price approximately doubles
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over the sample period, and the amount of the average real tax increases by about three times. Over
the time frame, the variability in both the prices and taxes across states increases. Most years the
average real price increases due to increases in taxes. In years when there are no tax changes in a
state, the real price of cigarettes falls as the nominal price increases less than inflation.
Figure 1.3 shows how real retail cigarette prices and taxes have changed over time in New York
and North Carolina. Much of the price difference between these two states can be attributed to the
difference in their cigarette taxes. Also, the increase in the price of cigarettes over time is driven by
the increase in the tax rates. Other factors behind the increase in cigarette prices over this time period
are the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement in 1998, and the increase in the federal cigarette
tax rate in 2009.17 Figure 1.4 shows the distribution of state cigarette tax rates over time. At the
beginning of the sample period, state cigarette taxes were relatively low. Over time, both the mean
and variance of the state cigarette tax distribution increased.
1.4.4 State Level Tobacco Policy Data
In addition to tobacco excise taxes, there are many other policies that states can pursue to influ-
ence the level of youth smoking. Some of these policies enter into the individual’s problem through
the budget constraint by imposing non-monetary costs on obtaining tobacco. Some examples of
policies that enter the individual’s problem in this way are restrictions on the sale of tobacco to mi-
nors, bans on the sale of tobacco in vending machines, and restrictions on free samples of tobacco
products. Another way for tobacco policies to influence behavior is through restrictions on tobacco
consumption. The overall utility one receives from smoking will be less if there are restrictions on
where and when one can smoke. Examples of restrictions on tobacco consumption are indoor smok-
ing bans and smoke-free schools. Finally, some tobacco policies influence the individual’s beliefs
and expectations. In the context of this paper, these policies influence the individual’s initial prior
beliefs. Examples include restrictions on cigarette advertisements, funding of tobacco prevention
17In 1998, 46 states came to an agreement with the four largest cigarette manufacturers. The states agreed to drop their
lawsuits against the tobacco companies, which sought compensation for the treatment of tobacco-related illnesses in the
Medicaid system. In exchange, the tobacco companies agreed to a monetary settlement, restrictions on the marketing
of tobacco products to young people, and the funding of a national anti-smoking organization. The tobacco companies
raised the price of cigarettes by 45 cents per pack in response to the settlement to cover the payments to the states.
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Figure 1.3: Real Cigarette Taxes and Prices in NY and NC (in year 2000 dollars)
Figure 1.4: Distribution of Real State Cigarette Taxes by Year
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and education programs, and requiring tobacco education in schools. The data on state tobacco poli-
cies are from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the National Cancer Institute (NCI), and the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA).
1.5 Estimation
1.5.1 Likelihood Function
Define the conditional value function for alternative j as the deterministic portion of flow utility
from that alternative (i.e., utility minus the preference shock) plus the discounted expected future
value of lifetime utility conditional on alternative j being chosen. Then, the conditional value func-
tion associated with alternative j in period t is given by:
vjnt(Snt,Γnt, Xnt) =
(
αn + Et[ρn|Γnt]g(Snt) + ξjXnt
)
z(aj)− Et[τn|Γnt]Snt1[aj > 0]
− Et[ωn|Γnt]q(aj, Snt)1[aj < Snt]− γnptaj + βEt[Vn,t+1(Sn,t+1,Γn,t+1, Xn,t+1)|djnt = 1] (1.13)
where
Vn,t+1(Sn,t+1,Γn,t+1, Xn,t+1) = E[max
j
vjn,t+1(Sn,t+1,Γn,t+1, Xn,t+1) + 
j
n,t+1] (1.14)
The expectation over the future value term is taken with respect to the distribution of future beliefs,
future demographic state variables, and future prices. The evaluation of current period utility depends
upon the mean of the prior beliefs only. The variance of the prior does affect the expectation over
future beliefs. The utility from not smoking is normalized to include the cost of withdrawal only,
so ξ1 = 0. The state variables are the level of smoking stock (i.e., last period’s smoking decision)
and the individual’s beliefs, denoted by Γ, which include beliefs about parameter values and future
prices.18 I assume an i.i.d. type I extreme value (EV) preference shock.19 The choice probabilities
18The price process has yet to be formally incorporated into the model, so the following estimation routine assumes
perfect knowledge of future prices. The proposed estimation routine can be extended to estimate the parameters of a
random price process.
19One of the major limitations of the multinomial logit model is the assumption that the shocks are uncorrelated over
alternatives (i.e., the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption). The use of random parameter, or mixed,
logit can overcome the limitations of this assumption. In fact, mixed multinomial logit can approximate any discrete
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after experimentation are given by:
P jnt =
ev
j
nt∑J
k=1 e
vknt
for j = 1, . . . , J (1.15)
For individuals who have never smoked, they first choose whether or not to experiment, and then,
conditional on experimenting, they decide the level of smoking. Let dEnt be an indicator variable that
equals one if the individual experiments in period t. The conditional value of experimenting is:
vEnt = (E[αn|Γnt] + ξEXnt)z(aE)− γptaE + Et[Vnt|dEnt = 1] (1.16)
The conditional value function of not experimenting is simply the discounted expected maximum
of the next period’s value function conditional on not experimenting and not consuming any of the
addictive good. The probability for experimenting, PEnt, is given by the Logistic cumulative distri-
bution function. For an individual who has never smoked prior to period t, the behavior in period t
is captured by the joint probability of experimenting and level of smoking (PEntP
j
nt). The decision to
experiment is made based on the individual’s belief about his level of α, so PEnt is calculated based on
an individual’s beliefs. If he decides to experiment, he learns his true level of α, so P jnt is calculated
using the individual’s true value of α.
There are a total of N individuals, and each individual is observed for a total of T + 1 periods.
The likelihood of individual n making the sequence of choices {∪j{djnt}, dEnt}Tt=1 is:
Ln
(
γ, ξ | θn,Γn,0,Λn
)
=
T∏
t=0
(( J∏
j=1
P
j djnt
nt
)Ant ∗ [(1− PEnt)1−dEnt(PEnt J∏
j=1
P
j djnt
nt
)dEnt]1−Ant) (1.17)
where Ant is an indicator for the individual having ever smoked prior to period t. If the individual
has smoked prior to period t (i.e., Ant = 1), the individual makes a consumption decision. If the
individual has not smoked prior to period t (i.e., Ant = 0), then the individual makes a sequential
choice model derived from a random utility model to within any arbitrary degree of precision (McFadden and Train
2000).
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experimentation and consumption decision. This individual likelihood is conditional on the individ-
ual’s true addictive parameters (θn), the distribution of individual’s initial prior beliefs (Γn,0), and a
given sequence of signal noise draws (Λn = {ψnt, λnt, ηnt}Tt=0). This formulation is equivalent to
conditioning on the individual’s beliefs at time t since the beliefs in time t are completely determined
by the individual’s initial prior, the sequence of signal noise, and the sequence of choices. Since the
individual’s true parameters and signal noise sequences are not observed by the researcher, the un-
conditional likelihood is calculated by integrating the conditional likelihood over the distribution of
these unobserved variables:
Ln(γ, ξ, σ
2
ψ, σ
2
λ, σ
2
η, θ¯,Σ) =∫
θ
∫
Λ
Ln
(
γ, ξ | θn,mn,0,Σn,0,Λn
)
dF (Λ|σ2ψ, σ2λ, σ2η) dF (θ|θ¯,Σ) (1.18)
and the full log-likelihood function is given by:
L (γ, ξ, σ2ψ, σ
2
λ, σ
2
η, θ¯,Σ) =
∑
n
log
(
Ln(γ, ξ, σ
2
ψ, σ
2
λ, σ
2
η, θ¯,Σ)
)
(1.19)
The total dimensions of unobserved variables is 3 ∗ T + 4.20 The integrals do not have a closed form
solution, so they must be approximated numerically. The parameters to be estimated include the util-
ity function parameters (γ, ξ), the mean and covariance matrix of the population distribution of the
rational addiction parameters (θ¯,Σ), and the variances of the signal noise distributions (σ2ψ, σ
2
λ, σ
2
η).
1.5.2 Identification
The model parameters are identified through the observed sequences of smoking decisions. The
parameters ξ and γ are identified through differences in smoking decisions between individuals with
different observable characteristics. The price sensitivity parameter γ is identified by both cross-
sectional variation and variation over time in the price of cigarettes. The utility from not smoking
when the smoking stock is zero is normalized to zero. The parameter α affects the utility for each
20The dimension of the unobserved signals is likely to be less than 3*T since some of the signals are observed by
the researcher. Based upon the sequence of actions, the researcher knows whether or not a signal is received in a given
period.
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level of smoking regardless of past smoking. The reinforcement parameter captures the effect of the
interaction between the current level of smoking and the smoking stock. The tolerance parameter
only depends on the smoking stock, so, for a given level of smoking stock, a change in the tolerance
parameter only affects the probability of smoking versus not smoking. The reinforcement parameter
affects the probability of smoking versus not smoking, but it also affects the probability of each
level of smoking. The withdrawal parameter only affects the utility of a reduction in the level of
smoking from one period to the next, so this parameter is identified by smokers who reduce their
level of smoking or quit smoking entirely. The match, tolerance, reinforcement, withdrawal, and
price sensitivity parameters do not vary across alternatives. Differences in utility for the different
levels of smoking for these parameters are ultimately a result of the functional form assumptions.
The individual-specific parameters are not point identified for each individual. There is no way
to estimate a specific value of these parameters for each individual. Also, since these parameters
are continuous, a distributional assumption is required for the population distribution of parameters.
Then, given that the conditional value function is defined over the support of the distribution of the
unobserved continuous variables, the parameters of the population distribution (mean and covari-
ance) are identified. The identification behind the learning process is driven by the fact that the
valuation an individual attributes to each alternative depends upon the individual’s current beliefs
only and not the individual’s true parameters. The individual’s beliefs converge to the true param-
eters as the individual receives additional signals. Therefore, individuals with a lot of experience
will behave according to their true parameter values. Also, if an individual knows his true parameter
values, he can use the model to calculate an optimal consumption sequence. Differences between the
optimal consumption sequence if the individual knows his true parameter values and the decisions of
the individual when he is inexperienced are driven by the difference between the individual’s beliefs
and his true parameter values. The speed at which the individual’s consumption sequence converges
to the optimal consumption sequence with full knowledge identifies the speed of learning (i.e., the
variance of the signals). Additional restrictions on the learning process are necessary for identifi-
cation. These include restrictions on the initial prior beliefs (Rational Expectations), distributional
assumptions for the beliefs and signals (both Normal), and Bayesian updating.
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1.5.3 Estimation Procedure
There are several computational requirements that make estimation of the parameters of the
model by Full Information Maximum Likelihood difficult. The main issue is that the evaluation of
the log likelihood function requires integrating over the continuous distribution of population param-
eters and over all possible sequences of signal noise. Simulated maximum likelihood is one method
that is used to overcome this problem. The unconditional likelihood function is approximated nu-
merically by taking random draws from the distribution of the unobserved variable, evaluating the
conditional likelihood, and taking the average of the conditional likelihoods over the draws. Evaluat-
ing the conditional likelihood, however, for a single draw still involves significant computation. The
solution to the individual’s problem requires integrating over future beliefs, which are multidimen-
sional continuous variables. One way to reduce the computational burden of evaluating the value
function is to use the Conditional Choice Probability (CCP) method of Hotz and Miller (1993).
Hotz and Miller (1993) show that when the preference shock has a GEV distribution, the future
value term in the conditional value function can be expressed as a function of future flow utilities
and conditional choice probabilities (CCPs). For certain classes of problems (e.g., optimal stopping
problems), taking the difference in conditional value functions leads to the future value term only
containing one period ahead flow utilities and CCPs. In other problems, the future value term asso-
ciated with the difference in conditional value functions contains flow utilities and CCPs for a finite
number of future periods. This property is called finite dependence, and it is a feature of the prob-
lem in this paper.21 Standard CCP estimation involves estimating the CCPs in a first stage using the
data and using the estimated CCPs to calculate the individual’s value function. One limitation of the
standard method is that it do not allow for unobserved heterogeneity. Arcidiacono and Miller (2011)
develop a method of CCP estimation that allows for a finite distribution of unobserved heterogene-
ity by using the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm. The unobserved heterogeneity in this
paper are the individual’s beliefs and the individual’s true parameter values, which are both continu-
ous. James and Matsumoto (2013) extend the work of Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) to allow for a
21See the Estimation Appendix for the derivation of the CCP representation of the future value term.
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continuous distribution of unobserved heterogeneity.
It can be shown that the values of the parameters that maximize the likelihood function (1.19)
also maximize the following transformed likelihood function:22
L (γ, ξ, σ2ψ, σ
2
λ, σ
2
η, θ¯,Σ) =
∑
n
∫
θ
∫
Λ
pin(θn,Λn)
(∑
t
(1− Ant)
[
(1− dEnt)log(1− PEnt) + dEntlog(PEnt)
]
+
∑
j
djntlog(P
j
nt)
)
dΛ dθ (1.20)
where pi is the conditional probability that the parameter values are θ, θ0, and Λ given the observed
choices. This conditional probability is given by:
pin(θn,Λn) =
f(θn|θ¯,Σ)f(Λn|σ2ψ, σ2λ, σ2η)
∏
t Lnt(θn,Λn)∫
θ
∫
Λ
∏
t Lnt(θn,Λn)f(Λn|σ2ψ, σ2λ, σ2η)f(θn|θ¯,Σ) dΛ dθ
(1.21)
The estimation routine in this paper used the likelihood function in equation 1.20. The procedure
starts by taking M draws from the distribution of the unobserved variables for each individual as
well as initial guesses for the values of the parameters and the CCPs. The estimation proceeds by
using the EM algorithm, specifically a simulated EM algorithm (SEM). The EM algorithm is an iter-
ative procedure that alternates between an expectation step (or E-step) and a maximization step (or
M-step). The E-step updates the CCPs and pi using the prior iteration values of the parameters and
CCPs. The M-step updates the value of the parameters by maximizing the likelihood function using
the updated CCPs and pi. The estimation continues to iterate over these two steps until the parameter
estimates converge. The use of the EM algorithm to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity has sev-
eral advantages.23 The most significant advantage is that the EM algorithm, or the SEM algorithm
in the current context, reintroduces additive separability of the likelihood function. This property
allows for sequential estimation of the likelihood function. In the current context, additive separa-
bility of the likelihood function allows for the parameters of the experimentation and consumption
22This is the expected conditional (on the unobserved variables) likelihood, where the expectation is taken with respect
to the distribution of the unobserved variables conditional on the observed variables and the choices.
23See Arcidiacono and Jones (2003) for a full discussion.
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decisions to be estimated separately. The estimation procedure is presented in greater detail in the
Estimation Appendix.
1.5.4 Initial Conditions
The first period that individuals are observed in the NLSY97 is not the same as the initial period
of the individual’s optimization problem. That is, individuals may enter the estimation sample having
already smoked. The values of the state variables in the initial wave of data depend on prior decisions
and state variables that are not observed by the researcher. Some individuals have never smoked by
the first wave. Others have smoked at some point prior to the first wave but are not observed to
smoke in the first wave. Finally, some individuals are regular smokers at the first wave. The latter
two groups present an initial conditions problem both in that the prior year’s smoking is not observed
in the first period and it is not observed how much they have learned. Individual’s initial prior beliefs
also present an initial conditions problem. I assume that individual initial priors are identical to the
population distribution of the parameters (i.e., Rational Expectations).24
For individuals who have smoked prior to the first wave, the amount smoked in the period prior to
the first wave is treated as discrete unobserved heterogeneity. The individual likelihood is calculated
for each possible alternative in period t = 0. The probability that the individual selected alternative
j in period t = 0 is:
P jn,0 =
1
1 + exp(ξjICX
IC
n,0)
(1.22)
The individual likelihood is calculated by multiplying the likelihood conditional on selecting alter-
native j in period t = 0 by the probability P jn,0 and summing over the alternatives.
1.5.5 Functional Forms
The utility for the smoking level associated with alternative j, contains several modifying func-
tions. The purpose of these functions is to allow for utility to be nonlinear in both the level of
smoking and the level of past smoking. In order to estimate the parameters of the model, these
generic functions must be replaced with specific functional forms. The function z(a) incorporates
24In future work, I will attempt to parameterize the initial priors by allowing the mean of the initial priors (and perhaps
the variance as well) to be functions of individual characteristics and state tobacco policies.
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the standard utility function assumptions except that the marginal utility of smoking is positive for a
level of smoking equal to zero. Also, the utility from not smoking is normalized to zero. The func-
tion z(a) is assumed to take the following form: z(a) = log(1 + a). The function that modifies the
effect of reinforcement takes the following form: g(St) =
√
St. Finally, the function that modifies
the withdrawal effect has the following form:
q(aj, Snt) = Snt ∗
(
1− exp
(
c ∗ (aj − Snt)
))
(1.23)
When the individual smokes the same amount as the prior period, q = 0. If the individual smokes
less than the prior period, the withdrawal cost is positive. For a given level of last period smoking,
the withdrawal cost decreases as the individual smokes more in the current period. This decrease
occurs at an increasing rate. The parameter c affects the curvature of the function q as well as the
maximum possible withdrawal cost. This parameter is initially fixed at a value of 0.15. Finally, the
discount parameter β is set to 0.95.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Parameter Estimates
This section presents the parameter estimates for the model. The estimation sample includes
white males who are observed in every time period. The version of the model that is estimated
differs from the model presented earlier in that the tolerance parameter τ is not estimated and set to
zero. Table 1.7 presents the parameter estimates for the model with learning as well as the model
without learning. The match parameter is negative for a large majority of the population. Even
individuals with a negative match parameter could receive positive utility from smoking due to the
effect of reinforcement. Individuals below the age of 18 experience a utility cost from smoking,
which is likely due to their inability to purchase cigarettes legally. This cost is increasing in the level
of smoking. The variance of the signals is significantly different from zero, which suggests that the
learning component of the model is significant.
In order to test the importance of learning, I estimate a version of the model without learning. In
the model without learning individuals are assumed to know the value of their parameters, but the
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Table 1.7: Estimation Results, Population Distribution Parameter Estimates
Parameter Description
Model with Model without
Learning Learning
α¯ Mean of match parameter -3.567 (0.291) -1.351 (0.042)
ρ¯ Mean of reinforcement parameter 1.573 (0.105) 0.363 (0.011)
ω¯ Mean of withdrawal parameter 0.595 (0.021) 0.150 (0.014)
V ar(α) Variance of match parameter 0.988 (0.100) 4.723 (0.221)
V ar(ρ) Variance of reinforcement parameter 0.290 (0.019) 0.167 (0.009)
V ar(ω) Variance of withdrawal parameter 0.444 (0.019) 0.038 (0.004)
Cov(α, ρ) Covariance of match and reinforcement -0.301 (0.245) 0.867 (0.031)
Cov(ρ, ω) Covariance of reinforcement and withdrawal 0.221 (0.012) 0.061 (0.006)
Cov(α, ω) Covariance of match and withdrawal -0.364 (0.023) 0.274 (0.032)
σλ Standard deviation of reinforcement signal 0.912 (0.051) -
ση Standard deviation of withdrawal signal 1.010 (0.071) -
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses
parameters vary across individuals.25 Estimates of the parameters from the model without learning
differ in important ways from the parameter estimates from the model with learning. The mean of the
population distribution of the match parameter is larger in magnitude in the model without learning
and has much higher variability in the population. The mean value of the reinforcement parameter
is nearly the same in both models, and the mean of the withdrawal parameter is smaller in the model
without learning. The population variance of the reinforcement and withdrawal parameters is smaller
in the model without learning.
Table 1.8 presents the estimates of the coefficients on the observable variables. The first panel
includes the estimates for the variables that enter the utility function as preference shifters. The
next panel includes the variables that affect price sensitivity, and is followed by the parameters that
affect the probability of different levels of prior unobserved consumption. The last panel includes
the variables that enter the utility of experimentation. Note that there is no experimentation decision
in the model without learning since individuals already know they value of the match parameter.
Other than the age variables, the coefficients on observable characteristics tend to be relatively small
25The model without learning corresponds to a restricted version of the model with learning. Specifically, the model
without learning is equivalent to the model with learning where the mean of the initial prior is set to the individual’s true
parameter value and the variance of the initial prior is set to zero.
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Table 1.8: Estimation Results, Coefficients on Observable Variables
Preference Shifting Variables
Variable
Model with Model without
Learning Learning
Years until age 18, light smoking -0.075 (0.088) -0.435 (0.052)
Years until age 18, moderate smoking -0.229 (0.186) -0.903 (0.176)
Years until age 18, heavy smoking -0.053 (0.357) -1.016 (0.337)
Years until age 18 squared, light smoking -0.055 (0.018) 0.005 (0.012)
Years until age 18 squared, moderate smoking -0.199 (0.044) 0.001 (0.039)
Years until age 18 squared, heavy smoking -0.305 (0.090) -0.013 (0.074)
Married, light smoking -0.146 (0.134) -0.052 (0.039)
Married, moderate smoking -0.064 (0.166) -0.127 (0.051)
Married, heavy smoking -0.273 (0.191) -0.041 (0.048)
Has children in household, light smoking 0.090 (0.142) 0.167 (0.039)
Has children in household, moderate smoking -0.057 (0.187) 0.107 (0.051)
Has children in household, heavy smoking 0.027 (0.215) -0.032 (0.049)
Price Sensitivity Variables
γ¯, Mean Price sensitivity 0.143 (0.111) 0.442 (0.025)
Under age 18 0.042 (0.031) -0.053 (0.112)
Employed 0.076 (0.028) -0.009 (0.018)
Income greater than $20k -0.022 (0.107) -0.024 (0.009)
Unobserved Prior Consumption Variables
Constant, light smoking 0.050 (0.741) 5.913 (4.978)
Constant, moderate smoking 0.277 (1.359) 1.047 (1.189)
Constant, heavy smoking -0.182 (1.654) -0.543 (1.623)
Years since first smoked, light smoking -0.068 (0.476) -3.581 (5.137)
Years since first smoked, moderate smoking 1.040 (0.492) -0.135 (0.213)
Years since first smoked, heavy smoking -0.377 (0.919) -0.153 (0.330)
Experimentation Variables
Years until age 18 -0.475 (0.096) -
Years until age 18 squared 0.128 (0.017) -
Married -0.155 (0.437) -
Has children in household 0.066 (0.317) -
aE 0.949 (0.290) -
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in magnitude
The price sensitivity parameter is larger for the model without learning. The model without
learning is limited in terms of explaining quitting (or any reduction is smoking). Since prices are
increasing throughout the sample, the model without learning attributes any reduction in smoking to
the increase in prices. Although an increase in the price of cigarettes is one reason why an individual
would reduce his level of smoking, the model with learning allows for other potential reasons. As
an individual experiments with smoking, he may discover that his true utility from smoking is less
than he initially believed it to be. An individual is also able to learn about the withdrawal cost
through reductions in smoking. So in the model with learning, reduction in smoking could be due
to the increase in price, new information about the utility from smoking, and strategic reductions in
smoking in order to learn about the withdrawal cost. By ignoring the mechanisms through which the
learning process generates endogenous quitting (or reduction), the model without learning overstates
the importance of price in explaining the observed level of quitting.
1.6.2 Model Fit
Table 1.9 presents the observed transition probabilities from the data as well as the transition
probabilities from simulated outcomes generated using the model with learning and the estimated
parameters. The model is able to fit the observed transition probabilities well. For smoking tran-
sitions for individuals under 18, the simulated data tends to overstate the persistence in smoking
behavior, particularly for remaining a nonsmoker and a heavy smoker. The model is better able to
fit the transition probabilities for individuals over 18 years old. Also, the simulated data tends to
underestimate the probability of quitting, particularly for heavy smokers.
Figure 1.5 shows the proportion of individuals in each smoking category by age for both the
observed and simulated data using the estimated model with learning. The simulated data closely
match the observed age profile of smoking behavior. Figure 1.6 compares the proportion of individ-
uals in each smoking category by age for the observed data and for simulated data using the model
without learning. The model without learning does a relatively poor job in matching the observed
data.
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Table 1.9: Transition Probabilities, Observed and Simulated Data
Under 18 years old
Smoking level at t
Observed Data Simulated Data
Smoking level at t− 1 None Light Moderate Heavy None Light Moderate Heavy
None 86.81 10.47 1.83 0.88 90.26 8.23 0.90 0.62
Light 35.21 44.92 14.25 5.62 35.06 52.28 9.08 3.58
Moderate 15.70 10.74 49.59 23.97 9.37 16.97 50.32 23.34
Heavy 9.84 8.20 22.95 59.02 4.24 4.75 18.79 72.21
Over 18 years old
Smoking level at t
Observed Data Simulated Data
Smoking level at t− 1 None Light Moderate Heavy None Light Moderate Heavy
None 89.60 8.09 1.52 0.79 85.95 11.41 1.76 0.88
Light 27.12 57.88 12.24 2.76 32.64 56.23 9.31 1.82
Moderate 9.90 16.30 55.82 17.99 7.63 13.13 59.98 19.26
Heavy 6.30 5.09 21.26 67.35 3.66 3.22 18.88 74.23
Figure 1.5: Smoking Rates by Age, Observed and Simulated Data from the Model with Learning
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Figure 1.7 illustrates the model fit for the experimentation decision. This figure shows the prob-
ability by age that an individual who has not previously experimented with smoking will experiment
as well as the cumulative probability that an individual has experimented at some point in the past.
Up until age 19, the model is able to closely fit the observed experimentation probability. After age
20, the probability that an individual experiments drop quickly to between 1 and 2 percent, however
the model predicts a much more gradual decline.
1.6.3 Policy Simulations
In this section, I use the parameter estimates from the model with learning to conduct policy
counterfactual experiments. I consider policies that alter cigarette prices, beliefs about withdrawal,
and the legal smoking age.26
Prices
The tobacco excise tax is a popular policy tool among policymakers and anti-smoking advocates
to reduce the level of smoking. The specific policy experiment is doubling the price of cigarettes.
Under the counterfactual policy, individuals are faced with a price of cigarettes that is two times what
is observed in the data. This counterfactual measures the long run impact of a change in the price of
tobacco. Figure 1.8 depicts the smoking rates by age for the baseline simulation and the simulated
data under the counterfactual prices.
Doubling prices has a dramatic effect on the proportion of smokers. For individuals over 18
years old, the proportion of nonsmokers increases by about 5 percentage points as a result of the
higher prices. The proportion of light smokers decreases by around 15 percent, and the proportion
of moderate and heavy smokers decreases by around 10 percent.27
Beliefs
Prior to experimentation with cigarettes, a young individual has beliefs about his smoking pref-
erence parameters. The model imposes rational expectations for the initial beliefs. However, the
26The legal smoking age is the minimum age at which an individual can legally purchase tobacco products.
27One concern with this counterfactual is that the CCPs are estimated using the data, so they are only identified for
values of the state variables that are observed in the data.
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Figure 1.6: Smoking Rates by Age, Observed and Simulated Data from Model without Learning
Figure 1.7: Experimentation Rates by Age, Observed and Simulated Data from Model with Learning
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individual’s initial beliefs are likely influenced by a number of factors and could potentially be influ-
enced by anti-smoking policies. For example, advertisements that highlight the addictive nature of
cigarettes and the difficulty of quitting smoking may affect the individual’s beliefs about the value
of the parameters that govern the effects of reinforcement, tolerance, and withdrawal.
In this counterfactual experiment, the mean initial prior for the withdrawal parameter is increased
by one standard deviation of the population distribution. Only the initial belief about the withdrawal
parameter changes. The actual distribution of the withdrawal parameter in the population is the same.
Increasing the mean value of the withdrawal parameter in one’s initial prior beliefs causes a
reduction in the overall level of smoking. Individuals are now less likely to experiment with smoking
given the higher anticipated cost of quitting. The higher expected withdrawal cost results in a large
reduction in the proportion of moderate and heavy smokers. The proportion of light smokers is
slightly less relative to the baseline simulation. Some individuals who were light smokers under the
baseline simulation decide not to smoke under the counterfactual. These individuals are offset by
those who were moderate and heavy smokers under the baseline who remain light smokers for a
longer period before transitioning to higher levels of smoking under the counterfactual. The increase
in the expected withdrawal cost has the effect of extending the experimentation period.
Legal Smoking Age
Another possible policy tool that targets youth smoking is the minimum legal age to purchase
tobacco. In this counterfactual experiment, the effect of increasing the minimum legal purchase
age to 19 years old. Relative to the baseline simulation, increasing the purchase age is effective
in reducing smoking among teenagers. However, increasing the legal purchase age only delays
smoking rather than preventing it. The smoking rates converge to the baseline simulation for all
smoking categories once individuals are able to legally purchase tobacco.
These counterfactual simulations confirm that increasing the price of cigarettes is an effective
policy tool to reduce the prevalence of smoking. Changing the legal smoking age would have the
effect of reducing youth smoking, but would likely have only a minimal impact in reducing smoking
in the broader population. Policies that target an individual’s initial prior beliefs about the utility of
smoking could be very effective in reducing smoking. Specifically, increasing an individual’s beliefs
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Figure 1.8: Smoking Rates by Age, Baseline Simulation and Price Counterfactual Data
Figure 1.9: Smoking Rates by Age, Baseline Simulation and Beliefs Counterfactual Data
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about the withdrawal cost would lead to a relatively large reduction in the probability that individual
would become a heavy smoker.
Figure 1.11 shows the experimentation probabilities by age for the different counterfactual sim-
ulations. The belief counterfactual has no effect on the probability that an individual experiments.
This is because an individual who experiments who does not continue to smoke will not experience
withdrawal. Increasing the price only has a minor effect on the probability that an individual ex-
periments. Even with the higher prices, the monetary cost of experimenting is minor. However, the
individual would be less likely to continue smoking as a higher value of the match parameter would
be required to offset the higher monetary cost of smoking. Increasing the smoking age simply delays
experimentation.
1.6.4 Welfare Analysis
Thus far, the policy analysis has evaluated the effectiveness of alternative policies in reducing
the level of smoking without taking into account the effect of the policies on an individual’s welfare.
One of the key advantages of the model with learning is the ability of the model to explain regret.
In the standard RA model, policies that increase the cost of smoking will lower the welfare of every
individual. In the model with learning, a policy that increases the cost of smoking may lower the
welfare of some individuals, but it may increase the welfare of others. If an individual who would
later regret the decision to become a smoker decided not to smoke because of the policy, that policy
would increase his welfare (assuming the policy did not affect the utility from not smoking).
To evaluate the effect of the alternative policies on welfare, I calculate the expected lifetime utility
(ELU) for each individual’s simulated sequence of choices. This measure includes the deterministic
portion of utility evaluated using the individual’s true parameters.28 Since different sequences of
choices lead to a different state space in the terminal period, the individual’s value function in the
final period is added to the sequence of flow utilities.29 The objective in constructing this measure of
28Note that expected lifetime utility refers to the ex-post deterministic flow utility up to the end of the sample period.
29Including the terminal period value function adds the value of information to the measure of welfare. An individual
would not regret smoking just because the ex-post flow of utility from smoking was less than not smoking, as long as the
value of information more than offsets the difference.
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Figure 1.10: Smoking Rates by Age, Baseline Simulation and Smoking Age Counterfactual Data
Figure 1.11: Experimentation Rates by Age, Baseline Simulation and Counterfactual Data
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Figure 1.12: Distribution of Expected Lifetime Utility
welfare is to determine the effect of the alternative policies on the individual’s ex-post welfare. The
welfare measure is normalized with respect to the sequence of never smoking. The expected flow
utility portion of the welfare measure is already normalized from the normalization of the utility
function. The terminal period value function is normalized by subtracting the terminal period value
function of the individual if he had never smoked.
Table 1.10 shows the summary statistics for the ELU measure of individual welfare for the base-
line simulation as well as under the different counterfactuals. The ELU of an individual is zero for
an individual who never smokes. The mean ELU for the baseline simulation is −0.660 and the me-
dian is −5.870. A vast majority of individuals have an ELU that is less than zero, indicating that
they are ex-post worse off than if they had never smoked. In the price counterfactual, the proportion
of individuals who never smoke increases. By increasing the proportion of individuals who never
smoke, these policies decrease the proportion of individuals with a negative ELU, but the policies
also decrease the proportion of individuals with a positive ELU. Individuals who enjoy smoking are
negatively affected by the increase in the price of cigarettes. Increasing initial beliefs about the diffi-
culty of quitting smoking decreases welfare on average as it decreases the proportion of individuals
with a positive ELU and increases the proportion of individuals with a negative ELU.
Figure 1.12 is a histogram that shows the distributional effects of the different smoking policies.
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Table 1.10: Welfare Analysis
Mean ELU Std ELU Med ELU Pr(ELU<0) Pr(ELU=0) Pr(ELU>0)
Baseline -0.660 27.388 -5.870 0.722 0.055 0.223
Price Cf -2.063 24.352 -5.686 0.739 0.062 0.199
Belief Cf -4.191 16.828 -4.981 0.791 0.075 0.135
Age Cf -1.981 25.042 -5.951 0.738 0.058 0.204
The first bar in each set represents the outcomes under the baseline simulation. The second, third,
and fourth bars are the results for the price, belief, and age counterfactuals respectively. All of
the policies reduce the welfare of individuals who enjoyed smoking under the baseline simulation
as there are fewer individuals in each range of positive ELU. The price and belief counterfactuals
also reduce the number of individuals in each range of negative ELU and increase the number of
individuals with an ELU close to zero. The individuals with a large negative ELU include those
who are “trapped” in their addiction. These are individuals who initially overestimated their true
tolerance and underestimated their true withdrawal. They receive a negative utility from smoking
but are not able to quit because they face a large withdrawal cost.
1.7 Conclusion
This research develops a model of rational addiction with learning in order to explain the smok-
ing initiation decision of young people. Estimation of the structural parameters of the model requires
significant computational resources, and is not computationally feasible using a full solution estima-
tion routine unless significant restrictions are placed on the model. Therefore, this paper proposes
the use of an alternative estimation routine. This estimation routine uses the EM algorithm and CCP
estimation, which reduces the computational burden of estimating the structural parameters of the
model.
Overall, the model is able to fit the data well. In particular, the model with learning fits the
data significantly better than the model without learning. The estimated parameters of the model are
used to conduct counterfactual policy experiments. Since an individual’s decision to smoke depends
upon his beliefs about his smoking preference parameters, policies that affect one’s beliefs can have
a significant impact on smoking behavior. Increasing individuals’ beliefs about the difficulty of
42
quitting smoking is effective at reducing the number of heavy smokers. Increasing cigarette prices is
shown to be an effective policy tool to reduce youth smoking, although the model without learning
overstates the importance of the price of cigarettes. An increase in the legal age to purchase cigarettes
would lead to a decrease in the number of youth smokers, but it would only delay smoking initiation
so adult smoking behavior would not be affected. The analysis of individual welfare supports the use
of taxes as an anti-smoking policy tool. An increase in the price of cigarettes improves the ex-post
level of utility for some individuals by discouraging those who would later regret the decision to
smoke from ever experimenting with cigarettes, but hurts those who do enjoy smoking.
The results of this paper suggest several potential avenues of future research. First, the analysis
performed considers the demand side of the market. Although the analysis in this paper demonstrates
the importance of learning in explaining cigarette demand, the model would need to be extended to
incorporate optimal firm behavior in order to better capture the general equilibrium effects of policy
changes. An individual’s initial beliefs are an important determinant of early smoking behavior, as
changing the initial beliefs was shown to have a large effect on behavior in the counterfactual simu-
lation. Additional exploration of how these initial beliefs are formed would be useful. In particular,
to what degree are the individual’s initial beliefs influenced by the smoking behavior of others (e.g.,
parents, siblings, peers) or by advertising (either pro- or anti-smoking). Finally, the importance of
learning in explaining youth smoking behavior begs the question of how learning about cigarette
smoking preferences may impact learning about preferences for consuming other addictive goods
such as alcohol or illegal drugs. There are potential knowledge spillovers about the dynamic ef-
fects of consuming an addictive good (i.e., tolerance, reinforcement, and withdrawal), which may be
correlated across different addictive goods for an individual.
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CHAPTER 2
USING CONDITIONAL CHOICE PROBABILITIES TO ESTIMATE DYNAMIC DISCRETE
CHOICE MODELS WITH CONTINUOUS UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY WITH AN
APPLICATION TO LEARNING MODELS (CO-AUTHOR JONATHAN JAMES)
2.1 Introduction
This paper develops a method for estimating dynamic discrete choice models with continuous
unobserved state variables using the conditional choice probability (CCP) method developed by
Hotz and Miller (1993). The use of CCP estimation results in substantial computational savings for a
range of dynamic discrete choice models. CCP estimation techniques were extended by Hotz, Miller,
Sanders, and Smith (1994) to cover a larger range of discrete choice models and by Arcidiacono
and Miller (2011) to incorporate a finite number of unobserved states. Allowing for unobserved
heterogeneity overcomes one of the primary obstacles to the practical application of CCP methods.
In this paper, we extend prior CCP estimation techniques to allow for a continuous distribution
of unobserved heterogeneity. One area where this technique could potentially yield the greatest
benefit is in the estimation of structural learning models. Even with recent computational advances,
estimation of learning models is often infeasible in many applications unless strong restrictions are
placed on the model.
In dynamic models, the current period value function not only depends on the current period util-
ity, but also the discounted expected future utility. In recursively defined models with a continuous
state variable, calculating the expected future value term requires integrating over potential realiza-
tions of the state variable for each future time period. Even when numerical methods are used to
simulate these integrals, estimation of these dynamic models can become infeasible as the number
of time periods increases or as the state space becomes richer. One way to deal with continuous vari-
ables is through discretization. Continuous state variables can also be incorporated in full solution
estimation techniques using the method developed by Keane and Wolpin (1994). They use simula-
tion techniques to calculate the value function at particular points (often randomly chosen) within the
state space. When solving the individual’s optimization problem, the individual’s value function at
other points in the state space is calculated through interpolation. When the continuous state variable
is unobserved, an additional computational burden is added. In estimation, the likelihood function
is formed by integrating over the unobserved variable. With time varying unobserved heterogeneity,
the individual’s problem, which requires integrating over future values of the unobserved variable,
must be solved for all possible current period values of the continuous variable.
The use of CCPs can reduce the computational burden of estimating models with continuous
unobserved heterogeneity by reducing the burden of solving the individual’s problem. In discrete
choice models, the choice probabilities are functions of the conditional value functions. Hotz and
Miller (1993) showed that for certain discrete choice models, there is an inverse mapping, so the
conditional value functions could be written as functions of the conditional choice probabilities. In
particular cases, the conditional value functions can be written as functions of flow utilities and con-
ditional choice probabilities for only a few periods into the future. With a continuous state variable,
the conditional choice probability representation of the value function still requires integrating over
future conditional choice probabilities. However, the conditional choice probability representation
of the value function can reduce the number of integrals by reducing the number of future value
terms that are required to evaluate the conditional value functions.
2.2 Simple Learning Framework
2.2.1 Model
Each period the individual chooses among J alternatives plus an outside option. The utility from
option j ∈ {1, . . . , J} is:
ujt = αjXt + µj + jt (2.1)
The utility from the outside option, j = 0, is normalized to zero. The vector  includes alternative-
and time-specific preference shocks assumed to be i.i.d. Type I extreme value. The vector µ =
(µ1, . . . , µJ) consists of individual-specific tastes for each of the alternatives, and individuals do not
45
know their true value of µ. The population distribution of µ is normal with mean µ¯ and variance Σ.
Although individuals do not know their true value of µ, they have a belief about its value. Individuals
learn about their true value of µ through experience.
The individual’s prior belief in period t is normally distributed with mean mt and variance Φt
(µt ∼ N(mt,Φt)). After choosing alternative j, the individual receives the signal:1
δjt = µj + ξjt (2.2)

ξ1
...
ξJ
 ∼ N(0, B) (2.3)
B =

σ2ξ1 0 · · · 0
0 σ2ξ2
. . . ...
... . . . . . . 0
0 · · · 0 σ2ξJ

(2.4)
Let djt be an indicator variable that equals 1 when the individual chooses alternative j. Then the
individual updates the mean and variance of his beliefs according to the following Bayesian updating
equations:
mt+1 = Φt+1(Φ
−1
t mt +B
−1Dδjt) (2.5)
Φt+1 = [Φ
−1
t +B
−1DD′]−1 (2.6)
Dt =

d1,t
...
dJ,t
 (2.7)
The information that the individual uses when evaluating all of the possible alternatives is contained
in a vector of state variables. These state variables are the mean and variance of the individual’s prior
1There is no signal associated with the outside option.
46
beliefs, m and Φ, and the individual’s observable characteristics, X . The conditional value function
for alternative j is:
vjt(mt,Φt, Xt) = αjXt + E[µj]
+
∑
X′
βE[V (X ′,mt+1,Φt+1|mt,Φt, Dt)] ∗ Pr(Xt+1 = X ′|Xt, Dt) (2.8)
Evaluating the future value term requires integrating over all possible values of the signal since dif-
ferent realizations of the signal will generate different beliefs in the future period. Also, the variable
µj enters the utility function linearly, so the current period utility can simply be evaluated using the
mean of the prior distribution (E[uj(µj)] = uj(E[µj])).2 The variance of the prior distribution affects
the likelihood of different realizations of the mean of the posterior distribution.
2.3 CCPs and Finite Dependence
In this section we show that the learning framework naturally generates a relatively simple ex-
pression for the future value term in the conditional value function. Calculation of the conditional
value function for each alternative requires solving the full dynamic learning model. The conditional
value function for alternative j is period t is given by 2.8. The expected future value term is cal-
culated by integrating over possible future state variables, including future beliefs. The individual’s
mean prior in period t + 1 depends upon his beliefs in period t as well as the realization of the
signal. So integrating over possible future beliefs requires integrating over possible realizations of
the signal. The variance of the future beliefs is a function of the variance of the current beliefs and
the variance of the signal. Since the individual knows the variance of the signal, the individual can
calculate the variance of future beliefs conditional on the choice. The variance of the prior beliefs
transitions deterministically conditional on the choice and does not depend on the actual realization
of the signals.
Consider the future value term in the conditional value function for alternative j. This term can
be expressed as a function of a conditional choice probability and the conditional value function of
2If µj enters the utility function non-linearly, then calculating expected utility requires integrating over the prior
distribution.
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any of the alternatives:
E[V (mt+1,Φt+1|mt,Φt, Dt)] = Em[log(
J∑
j=0
exp(vj,t+1(mt+1,Φt+1))] (2.9)
= Em[v0,t+1 + log(1 +
J∑
j=1
exp(vj,t+1 − v0,t+1))]
= Em[v0,t+1 − log(P0,t+1(mt+1,Φt+1))]
= Em[u0,t+1 + β ∗ E[V (mt+2,Φt+2|mt+1,Φt+1, Dt+1)]
−log(P0,t+1)]
The CCP representation still contains a future value term for period t + 2. The future value term
associated with the conditional value function for the outside option has the following CCP repre-
sentation:
E[V (mt+1,Φt+1|mt,Φt, Dt)] = Em[log(
J∑
j=0
exp(vj,t+1(mt+1,Φt+1))] (2.10)
= Em[vj,t+1 + log(1 +
∑
k 6=j
exp(vk,t+1 − vj,t+1))]
= Em[uj,t+1 + β ∗ E[V (mt+2,Φt+2|mt+1,Φt+1, Dt+1)]
−log(Pj,t+1)]
When forming the choice probability in the likelihood function, what matters is the difference in
conditional value functions. Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) show that it may be possible in a given
problem to choose a particular form of the CCP representation such that the future value term k
periods in the future cancels when taking the difference in conditional value functions. Finite de-
pendence is the term they use to define the property of expressing the difference in conditional value
functions in such a way to generate the cancellation of the future value terms. Given how beliefs
transition in learning models, it is possible to generate finite dependence in beliefs.3
3Finite dependence must also hold for the other state variables along the choice sequence used to generate finite
dependence in beliefs in order for the estimation procedure to be feasible.
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The period t+2 value functions in equations (2.10) and (2.11) are equal to each other if the period
t + 2 state variables are the same after the sequence {j, 0} and the sequence {0, j} in expectation.
For each of the sequences, the individual will receive one signal about the utility of alternative j.
The variance of the priors will be the same after both sequences. The individual’s expectation in
period t of the mean of the priors in period t + 2 will also be the same for each sequence. Prior to
the realization of the signals, all that matters to the individual when forming expectations of future
beliefs is which signals will be received, not the timing of the signals.
2.3.1 Likelihood Function
The probability of individual n selecting alternative j in period t conditional on the state variables
is:
P jnt(mnt,Φnt, Xnt) =
exp(vjnt(mnt,Φnt, Xnt))∑J
k=0 exp(v
k
nt(mnt,Φnt, Xnt))
(2.11)
The individual’s contribution to the likelihood function conditional on his true parameter values and
sequence of signal noises is:
Ln(µn,∆n) =
∏
t
∏
j
P jnt(mnt,Φnt, Xnt|µn,∆n) (2.12)
where ∆n = {δn,1, . . . , δnt}. The unconditional likelihood function is obtained by integrating over
the distribution of parameter values and signals.
Ln =
∫
µ,∆
Ln(µn,∆)f(∆, µ|µ¯,Σ, σξ) d∆ dµ (2.13)
The full sample likelihood is calculated as the product over the individuals’ likelihoods. The param-
eters that need to be estimated are the parameters of the population distribution of µ, the variance of
the signal, and the coefficients of the observed state variables in the utility function.
2.4 The Estimation Algorithm
The model parameters can be estimated using Simulated Maximum Likelihood. The estimation
procedure we propose is based on the EM Algorithm. First, we will present the estimation proce-
dure, and then we will discuss the advantages of using the EM Algorithm over Simulated Maximum
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Likelihood.
Denote the parameters to be estimated as θ. Then the parameters that maximize the log likelihood
function will also maximize the following equation:
L (θ) =
∑
n
∫
µ,∆
q(µn,∆n|D,X, θ)log(Ln(µn,∆n)f(µn,∆n|θ)) dµ d∆ (2.14)
where
q(µn,∆n|D,X, θ) = Ln(µn,∆n)f(µn,∆n|θ)∫
µ,∆
Ln(µ,∆)f(µ,∆|θ) dµ d∆ (2.15)
Equation 2.14 is the expected conditional likelihood of the joint probability of the individual’s
choices and the unobserved heterogeneity, where the expectation is over the distribution q, which
is the conditional probability distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity. This expected likelihood
function serves as the basis of the estimation procedure.
The estimation method in this section extends the method of Arcidiacono and Miller (2011).
Their method incorporates unobserved heterogeneity as a finite mixture distribution over unobserved
types using the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm. We extend this approach to allow for any
continuous distribution of unobserved heterogeneity by using simulation methods. The estimation
procedure uses a CCP representation of the individual’s value function in the maximization step of a
Simulated EM (SEM) algorithm. An individual’s “type” corresponds to a draw from the distribution
of unobserved heterogeneity.
Each step of the estimation procedure will be covered in detail after an overview of the entire
process. The algorithm begins with initial guesses for the parameters and iterates over the following
steps:
1. E-step, part 1: Use the current parameter values to update q.
2. E-step, part 2: Update the Conditional Choice Probabilities (CCPs) using the current parameter
values.
3. M-step: Update the parameter estimates by maximizing the simulated likelihood function us-
ing the updated CCPs and values of q.
50
The process terminates when the parameter estimates converge. Since the EM algorithm is an iter-
ative procedure, the maximization step (or M-step) must be performed on each iteration. The SML
estimator only requires maximizing the likelihood function a single time. Despite the iterative nature
of the estimation, the EM algorithm can still yield considerable computational savings. The use of
CCPs in the maximization step can require far fewer computations than full solution methods. Also,
the EM algorithm reintroduces additive separability in the maximization step. When the likelihood
function is additively separable, it may be possible to estimate the parameters sequentially.
2.4.1 E step
The Expectation step uses the prior iteration parameter estimates, θˆ = (α, µ¯,Σ, σξ), to update the
conditional probability distribution of the unobserved variable, q, and the CCPs, Pˆ . The probability
distribution of the unobserved variables and the CCPs are functions of µ, which can take an infinite
number of values. Each individual, however, can only take on a finite number of values correspond-
ing to the draws needed to simulate the likelihood function. Therefore, these functions only need to
be evaluated at a finite number of points. Denote the iteration number with a superscript.
The first step is to use the prior iteration estimates of the population distribution parameters to
update the individual parameter values:
µm,s+1n = µ¯
s + chol(Σs)ηmn , for m = 1, ...,M (2.16)
where {ηmn }Mm=1 are size J vector draws from the standard normal distribution, and chol(Σs) is
the lower triangular Cholesky decomposition of the population variance matrix. The value of the
sequences of signal draws are updated similarly using the current iteration estimate of the standard
deviation of the signal. The following equation updates q:
qm,s+1(µn,∆n) =
Ln(µ
m
n ,∆
m
n )
1
M
∑M
m=1 Ln(µ
m
n ,∆
m
n )
(2.17)
The CCPs are updated as a weighted multinomial logit of the outcome on a flexible polynomial of the
state variables where the weights are q. Alternatively, the CCPs can be updated using the structure
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of the model. The model can be used to calculate the probability of a given choice at different points
in the state space and interpolation methods can be used to generate estimates of the CCPs at other
points in the state space.
2.4.2 The M Step
The maximization step uses the updated CCPs and the updated q’s to maximize the simulated
version of equation (2.14). The updated parameter estimates are:
θs+1 = max
θ
N∑
n=1
1
M
M∑
m=1
qm,s+1n log(Ln(θ, Pˆ
s+1)) (2.18)
It is important to note that equation (2.14) is additively separable in the likelihood of the choice (Ln)
and the likelihood of the unobserved heterogeneity (f(µ,∆|θ)). The latter term can be used to update
the parameters of the distribution of unobserved variables. The updated distribution parameters are
the ML estimate of the mean and variance of the multinomial normal distribution, which simply
becomes the mean and covariance matrix of the sample ({µn,∆n}Nn=1) with weights q. The closed
form solution for the updated distribution parameters follows Train (2007). Additionally, the EM
Algorithm introduces additive separability into the choice likelihood, Ln, which could allow for
sequential estimation of the other model parameters (Arcidiacono and Jones 2003). Finally, it is
possible to use an alternative version of the EM algorithm that replaces the full maximization in the
M step with a single iteration of an optimization procedure. This variant of the EM algorithm is
known as the Generalized EM (GEM) algorithm. Using the GEM variant requires more iterations,
but can substantially reduce the computation required for each iteration. Full maximization in the
M step can be computationally intensive particularly if the optimization procedure uses numerical
gradients.4
4See James (2015) for an application of the GEM algorithm to estimate random parameter Logit models.
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2.5 Monte Carlo Results
2.5.1 Simple Learning Model
In this section we present Monte Carlo estimation results for a simplified version of the model
where individuals are myopic. In the next section we present results for the estimation of the full
model. The motivation for estimating the simplified model is to compare the basic estimation pro-
cedure with Simulated Maximum Likelihood. This comparison is not feasible in the full model as
performing a large enough number of iterations of the estimation using SML is computationally
prohibitive.
The values used in simulation are: T = 20 and J = 2. For each of 20 simulated data sets,
estimation is performed using SML and the EM Algorithm for a given number of draws (M =
{100, 500, 1000}). The simulations are repeated for different numbers ofX variables (K = {0, 1, 5)}),
and different sample sizes (N = {100, 500}). For the EM Algorithm, we use a sequential M step.
The updated distribution parameters have a closed form solution. The coefficients of the X variables
are updated as a single NR iteration of the simulated likelihood function. Optimization is performed
using numerical gradients.5 All computation is performed in MATLAB on a 12 processor com-
puter.6 The convergence criteria for the EM algorithm is that every parameter change by less than
0.5% across iterations, which is the criteria suggested by Train (2007), or a cumulative change in
the parameters by less than 1e − 4. For SML, the MATLAB defaults for the fminunc optimization
command were used. The true parameter values were used as the initial values for both procedures
and the same set of random draws were used.7
Table 2.1 presents the results for N = 100 and K = 0. The table reports the mean, standard
5In the naive learning model, it would be possible to use analytic gradients, which would significantly improve the
speed of the estimation. However, in the full dynamic learning model, only numerical gradients would be feasible.
6In the full dynamic learning model, certain computationally burdensome parts of the estimation algorithm use FOR-
TRAN Mex files in MATLAB. FORTRAN Mex files are MATLAB executable subroutines that are written and compiled
using FORTRAN.
7Starting at the true parameters biases the comparison in favor of SML. The EM algorithm performs better than
gradient based optimization methods at points far from the optimum, but converges slower near the optimum.
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deviation, and median for the set of parameter estimates across simulations for both the EM Algo-
rithm and SML. These summary statistics are also provided for the time it took for the estimation
procedure to converge as well as the number of iterations.8 Finally, we report the number of times the
estimation procedure successfully converged of the 20 total simulations.9 The first panel in table 2.1
reports the results for 100 draws used in simulation. The second and third panel report the results for
500 and 1000 draws respectively. The variables reported include the mean of the population distri-
bution (µ1 and µ2), the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix, and the standard deviation
of the signal distribution.
Particularly for the higher number of simulation draws, both estimation methods are able to
recover the true parameters. The EM Algorithm has difficulty identifying the covariance term when
few draws are used. The variability of the parameter estimates is higher for the EM Algorithm, but
the EM Algorithm is significantly faster.10 The M step in the EM Algorithm only uses part of the
likelihood function, so we would expect a loss in efficiency relative to SML. For each number of
simulation draws, SML takes about the same number of iterations on average to converge. Since the
number of computations needed to calculate the simulated likelihood function is proportional to the
number of draws, calculating the simulated likelihood function for 500 draws takes about 5 times as
long as for 100 draws. Since the number of iterations does not change when 500 draws are used,
SML takes about 5 times as long when going from 100 to 500 draws. On the other hand, the EM
Algorithm converges in fewer iterations as more draws are used. Each iteration takes longer with
more draws, but since fewer iterations are needed, the total estimation time increases by less than the
increase in the number of draws. The number of iterations for the EM Algorithm contains some very
large outliers (the mean time and mean iterations are much larger than the medians). As the number
8If computation were performed on a single processor, the estimation time would be approximately 12 times the
numbers reported.
9The most common reason why the EM Algorithm failed to converge was due to the variance terms either going to
zero or becoming very large.
10There is a tradeoff in setting the convergence criteria. A more difficult criteria could lead to less variability in the
estimates but would add to the estimation time. However, it is not straight forward to set a consistent convergence criteria
for both estimation methods.
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of draws increases, these outliers occur less frequently.
Table 2.2 presents the results for N = 100 and K = 1 and table 2.3 presents the results for
N = 100 and K = 5. The results are qualitatively similar to those without the observed X variables.
There is more variation in the parameter estimates from the EM algorithm, but the estimation is
significantly faster in most cases. When only 100 draws are used, the average estimation time is less
for SML, but the median time is still higher. When more draws are used, the EM algorithm becomes
faster on average.
The next set of results repeats the analysis using a larger sample size (N = 500). Table 2.4
presents the results for K = 0, table 2.5 presents the results for K = 1, and table 2.6 presents the
results for K = 5. The larger sample size results in much less variation in the parameter estimates.
Also, the increase in sample size improves the identification of the parameters when few draws are
used. Even when 100 draws are used, the EM algorithm is now better able to estimate the covariance
parameter. The EM algorithm converges with far fewer iterations and increasing the number of draws
no longer results in a reduction in the number of iterations. The time differential between the EM
algorithm and SML becomes much more dramatic with the larger sample size. For the case with
no X variables (K = 0), the EM algorithm performs nearly as well as SML in recovering the true
parameters in approximately 10% of the time.
2.5.2 Full Learning Model
For the full dynamic model, we consider the estimation procedure in a stationary infinite horizon
framework. The additional complexity of solving the dynamic problem makes Simulated Maximum
Likelihood infeasible for the purposes of this exercise. The values used in the simulations are the
same as the previous section except the estimation is not done for the largest number of draws
(M = 1000) or the largest number of variables in X (K = 5). The discount factor is fixed at
β = 0.9. In integrating over future continuous state variables in the conditional likelihood function,
500 draws are used to approximate the integrals.
Table 2.7 presents the results forK = 0. For a sample size ofN = 100, there is a lot of variability
in the estimated parameters. Increasing the number of draws slightly improves the results. Going
from 100 to 500 draws approximately doubles the time it takes to estimate the parameters. Even
55
though each iteration takes longer with more draws, fewer iterations are required for convergence.
Going to the large sample size greatly improves the parameter estimates. For the sample size of
500, increasing the number of draws does not reduce the median number of iterations required for
convergence, but the average number of iterations falls due to fewer large outliers.
Table 2.8 presents the results for K = 1. The results are similar to those with K = 0. The
larger sample size allows for better identification of the parameters. Increasing the number of draws
reduces the number of iterations required for the smaller sample size, but has less of an effect for the
larger sample size.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we extend CCP estimation techniques to allow for a continuous distribution of un-
observed heterogeneity. In many cases, the use of a finite non-parametric distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity (i.e., Arcidiacono and Miller, 2011) is likely to perform as well or better than a para-
metric continuous distribution. One significant exception is the when the parametric assumption is
made in the model, as is the case with learning models. The estimation procedure developed in this
paper provides a computationally feasible method for the estimation of learning models.
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Table 2.1: Naive learning model Monte Carlo results for N = 100 and K = 0
M = 100
EM SML
Variable True Value Mean SD Median Mean SD Median
µ1 1.0 1.430 1.095 1.109 0.923 0.100 0.920
µ2 1.0 1.457 1.102 1.082 0.968 0.128 0.986
Ch11 2.0 2.396 1.401 1.923 2.024 0.236 2.048
Ch22 2.0 2.060 0.253 2.072 2.081 0.236 2.126
Ch21 -0.5 0.372 2.010 -0.386 -0.438 0.287 -0.357
σ 0.25 0.198 0.103 0.239 0.420 0.245 0.385
Time (min) 8.4 11.3 2.2 9.8 1.7 9.6
Iterations 108.0 145.4 28.0 15.4 2.7 15.0
Successes 20 20
M = 500
µ1 1.0 1.190 0.524 1.051 0.947 0.095 0.922
µ2 1.0 1.205 0.549 1.150 0.988 0.134 0.946
Ch11 2.0 2.192 0.504 2.065 2.028 0.238 2.062
Ch22 2.0 2.109 0.238 2.089 2.050 0.231 2.065
Ch21 -0.5 -0.057 0.834 -0.278 -0.455 0.272 -0.403
σ 0.25 0.238 0.057 0.251 0.404 0.288 0.333
Time (min) 18.0 36.2 7.5 53.2 8.5 52.9
Iterations 47.9 96.1 20.0 16.6 1.8 16.5
Successes 19 20
M = 1000
µ1 1.0 1.186 0.596 1.055 0.957 0.095 0.936
µ2 1.0 1.237 0.637 1.044 0.992 0.132 0.931
Ch11 2.0 2.230 0.675 2.045 1.991 0.234 2.025
Ch22 2.0 2.120 0.264 2.121 2.058 0.239 2.030
Ch21 -0.5 0.058 1.210 -0.334 -0.439 0.231 -0.395
σ 0.25 0.253 0.007 0.252 0.293 0.232 0.236
Time (min) 15.1 8.6 12.7 110.5 21.8 103.7
Iterations 20.2 11.4 17.0 17.1 2.7 17.0
Successes 19 20
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Table 2.2: Naive learning model Monte Carlo results for N = 100 and K = 1
M = 100
EM SML
Variable True Value Mean SD Median Mean SD Median
α1 1.0 1.035 0.437 0.960 0.953 0.282 0.933
α2 -1.0 -0.876 0.563 -0.933 -0.958 0.310 -0.878
µ1 1.0 1.081 0.685 0.914 1.020 0.153 1.005
µ2 1.0 1.159 0.556 1.114 1.011 0.178 1.029
Ch11 2.0 2.071 0.432 1.986 2.046 0.210 1.969
Ch22 2.0 1.883 0.422 1.766 1.987 0.277 2.008
Ch21 -0.5 -0.347 1.111 -0.745 -0.507 0.353 -0.433
σ 0.25 0.226 0.074 0.250 0.453 0.265 0.425
Time (min) 22.7 50.7 6.0 17.9 2.6 18.6
Iterations 77.6 165.1 23 21.2 3.1 21.0
Successes 20 20
M = 500
α1 1.0 0.968 0.259 0.962 0.934 0.217 0.947
α2 -1.0 -0.975 0.312 -0.917 -0.943 0.267 -0.945
µ1 1.0 1.080 0.648 0.864 1.006 0.132 1.004
µ2 1.0 1.131 0.464 1.123 1.023 0.154 1.019
Ch11 2.0 2.148 0.499 2.073 2.044 0.189 1.988
Ch22 2.0 1.948 0.371 1.859 1.994 0.246 1.929
Ch21 -0.5 -0.309 1.079 -0.671 -0.557 0.256 -0.547
σ 0.25 0.231 0.074 0.253 0.417 0.272 0.369
Time (min) 89.0 192.5 19.7 75.3 14.0 75.2
Iterations 72.9 147.7 19.0 19.4 3.28 19.5
Successes 20 20
M = 1000
α1 1.0 0.985 0.317 1.018 0.958 0.241 1.010
α2 -1.0 -1.000 0.313 -0.944 -0.950 0.270 -0.911
µ1 1.0 1.029 0.607 0.848 1.007 0.127 1.000
µ2 1.0 1.073 0.404 1.088 1.021 0.150 1.008
Ch11 2.0 2.164 0.529 2.092 2.042 0.190 2.041
Ch22 2.0 1.909 0.337 1.864 1.959 0.226 1.956
Ch21 -0.5 -0.420 0.896 -0.631 -0.561 0.282 -0.514
σ 0.25 0.250 0.014 0.253 0.360 0.275 0.270
Time (min) 54.3 63.9 38.9 147.7 31.8 143.6
Iterations 26.4 28.1 20.0 18.9 3.3 19.0
Successes 19 20
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Table 2.3: Naive learning model Monte Carlo results for N = 100 and K = 5
M = 100
EM SML
Variable True Value Mean SD Median Mean SD Median
α¯1 1.0 1.063 0.385 1.046 1.067 0.335 1.029
α¯2 -1.0 -1.018 0.328 -0.978 -0.971 0.274 -0.954
µ1 1.0 1.002 0.407 1.010 1.029 0.173 1.041
µ2 1.0 1.157 0.453 1.262 0.985 0.116 0.977
Ch11 2.0 1.968 0.520 2.024 2.044 0.274 1.988
Ch22 2.0 1.865 0.527 1.895 2.103 0.296 2.099
Ch21 -0.5 -0.384 0.998 -0.207 -0.460 0.302 -0.499
σ 0.25 0.340 0.441 0.259 0.450 0.333 0.147
Time (min) 123.9 219.3 35.2 39.5 6.9 38.7
Iterations 141.1 240.0 44.0 27.2 4.9 27.0
Successes 18 20
M = 500
α¯1 1.0 1.058 0.321 1.034 1.094 0.325 1.041
α¯2 -1.0 -0.968 0.318 -0.948 -0.996 0.282 -0.969
µ1 1.0 1.035 0.447 1.035 1.011 0.176 1.030
µ2 1.0 1.182 0.424 1.187 0.991 0.122 0.979
Ch11 2.0 2.092 0.231 2.059 1.999 0.182 2.015
Ch22 2.0 1.994 0.246 1.988 1.997 0.279 1.950
Ch21 -0.5 -0.177 0.798 -0.365 -0.565 0.244 -0.552
σ 0.25 0.252 0.016 0.253 0.417 0.317 0.321
Time (min) 117.3 65.3 91.2 168.9 23.8 163.8
Iterations 38.8 20.4 29.5 23.4 3.22 23.5
Successes 20 20
M = 1000
α¯1 1.0 1.076 0.313 1.067 1.106 0.305 1.045
α¯2 -1.0 -0.966 0.297 -0.938 -0.991 0.270 -0.968
µ1 1.0 1.020 0.420 1.082 0.999 0.169 1.030
µ2 1.0 1.166 0.407 1.208 0.995 0.120 0.993
Ch11 2.0 2.076 0.189 2.063 1.992 0.181 1.958
Ch22 2.0 2.009 0.254 1.973 1.989 0.301 2.041
Ch21 -0.5 -0.225 0.703 -0.290 -0.546 0.226 -0.552
σ 0.25 0.240 0.022 0.247 0.409 0.350 0.295
Time (min) 268.7 177.5 196.6 321.9 44.2 332.4
Iterations 44.6 27.3 34.5 22.5 3.3 22.0
Successes 20 20
59
Table 2.4: Naive learning model Monte Carlo results for N = 500 and K = 0
M = 100
EM SML
Variable True Value Mean SD Median Mean SD Median
µ1 1.0 1.078 0.114 1.094 0.994 0.066 0.983
µ2 1.0 1.044 0.166 1.026 0.964 0.053 0.966
Ch11 2.0 1.951 0.115 1.946 1.980 0.106 1.984
Ch22 2.0 1.973 0.125 1.991 2.060 0.166 2.025
Ch21 -0.5 -0.475 0.247 -0.476 -0.450 0.115 -0.447
σ 0.25 0.248 0.008 0.250 0.229 0.145 0.224
Time (min) 6.6 3.6 5.7 57.0 9.4 57.1
Iterations 16.8 9.0 14.5 15.7 2.1 16
Successes 18 20
M = 500
µ1 1.0 1.069 0.128 1.057 1.017 0.056 1.023
µ2 1.0 1.036 0.169 0.991 0.979 0.049 0.985
Ch11 2.0 2.008 0.112 2.021 2.010 0.125 2.026
Ch22 2.0 2.023 0.120 2.011 2.040 0.106 2.054
Ch21 -0.5 -0.450 0.218 -0.437 -0.486 0.112 -0.472
σ 0.25 0.250 0.005 0.251 0.340 0.152 0.307
Time (min) 31.0 18.8 26.9 307.2 42.7 315.1
Iterations 16.1 9.7 14.0 17.3 2.2 17.5
Successes 20 20
M = 1000
µ1 1.0 1.072 0.127 1.071 1.017 0.054 1.020
µ2 1.0 1.038 0.167 0.998 0.984 0.049 0.982
Ch11 2.0 2.017 0.111 2.027 2.015 0.122 2.015
Ch22 2.0 2.041 0.119 2.036 2.024 0.107 2.032
Ch21 -0.5 -0.429 0.222 -0.394 -0.515 0.092 -0.498
σ 0.25 0.251 0.003 0.251 0.350 0.158 0.322
Time (min) 62.9 37.5 55.3 624.9 122.2 593.9
Iterations 16.5 9.9 14.5 18.4 2.7 19.0
Successes 20 20
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Table 2.5: Naive learning model Monte Carlo results for N = 100 and K = 1
M = 100
EM SML
Variable True Value Mean SD Median Mean SD Median
α1 1.0 0.952 0.105 0.956 0.961 0.112 0.949
α2 -1.0 -1.009 0.129 -1.008 -1.006 0.140 -1.010
µ1 1.0 0.950 0.219 0.965 0.976 0.073 0.980
µ2 1.0 1.073 0.136 1.046 1.016 0.064 1.011
Ch11 2.0 1.991 0.157 1.987 2.066 0.110 2.070
Ch22 2.0 1.940 0.159 1.923 2.012 0.120 2.029
Ch21 -0.5 -0.513 0.277 -0.581 -0.478 0.104 -0.462
σ 0.25 0.250 0.011 0.250 0.276 0.171 0.269
Time (min) 21.1 14.0 16.1 73.4 12.5 70.9
Iterations 20.4 12.7 16.0 17.7 2.9 18.0
Successes 20 20
M = 500
α1 1.0 0.971 0.102 0.999 0.973 0.105 1.000
α2 -1.0 -1.021 0.114 -1.024 -1.015 0.129 -1.008
µ1 1.0 0.933 0.191 0.979 0.988 0.066 1.004
µ2 1.0 1.061 0.120 1.068 1.032 0.068 1.044
Ch11 2.0 2.047 0.116 2.038 2.048 0.101 2.037
Ch22 2.0 1.982 0.115 1.984 2.038 0.113 2.058
Ch21 -0.5 -0.511 0.214 -0.564 -0.494 0.092 -0.489
σ 0.25 0.251 0.005 0.249 0.383 0.153 0.411
Time (min) 82.8 40.6 73.9 394.6 77.1 376.7
Iterations 16.9 7.6 15.5 18.9 3.06 18.5
Successes 20 20
M = 1000
α1 1.0 0.980 0.090 0.980 0.980 0.094 0.998
α2 -1.0 -1.012 0.121 -1.022 -1.009 0.128 -1.005
µ1 1.0 0.933 0.187 0.933 0.989 0.066 1.015
µ2 1.0 1.059 0.133 1.087 1.032 0.066 1.046
Ch11 2.0 2.049 0.124 2.034 2.051 0.102 2.045
Ch22 2.0 1.991 0.106 1.994 2.033 0.111 2.057
Ch21 -0.5 -0.508 0.189 -0.508 0.513 0.102 0.505
σ 0.25 0.250 0.004 0.250 0.347 0.185 0.353
Time (min) 159.3 83.6 139.7 800.3 142.8 765.8
Iterations 16.6 8.0 15.0 19.2 2.3 19.5
Successes 20 20
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Table 2.6: Naive learning model Monte Carlo results for N = 500 and K = 5
M = 100
EM SML
Variable True Value Mean SD Median Mean SD Median
α¯1 1.0 0.956 0.126 0.952 0.982 0.121 0.982
α¯2 -1.0 -0.951 0.141 -0.960 -0.975 0.144 -0.979
µ1 1.0 1.108 0.205 1.099 0.953 0.071 0.945
µ2 1.0 1.105 0.219 1.137 0.979 0.087 0.967
Ch11 2.0 1.964 0.122 1.947 2.032 0.132 2.037
Ch22 2.0 1.977 0.201 1.996 2.017 0.130 2.009
Ch21 -0.5 -0.349 0.314 -0.348 -0.511 0.152 -0.505
σ 0.25 0.253 0.023 0.248 0.231 0.147 0.243
Time (min) 103.8 75.0 65.9 163.6 27.1 157.8
Iterations 33.7 21.8 23 22.7 3.5 21
Successes 20 20
M = 500
α¯1 1.0 1.010 0.113 1.013 1.009 0.109 1.015
α¯2 -1.0 -0.982 0.132 -0.994 -0.995 0.131 -1.007
µ1 1.0 1.031 0.166 1.019 0.966 0.065 0.957
µ2 1.0 1.035 0.186 1.019 1.000 0.077 0.993
Ch11 2.0 2.007 0.115 1.993 2.015 0.111 1.983
Ch22 2.0 1.998 0.165 2.046 1.996 0.110 2.010
Ch21 -0.5 -0.422 0.223 -0.445 -0.530 0.105 -0.505
σ 0.25 0.250 0.005 0.250 0.334 0.184 0.318
Time (min) 306.0 212.3 228.0 870.1 175.7 843.5
Iterations 22.1 14.2 17.0 23.4 2.8 23.5
Successes 20 20
M = 1000
α¯1 1.0 1.008 0.106 1.013 1.015 0.108 1.023
α¯2 -1.0 -0.979 0.129 -0.988 -0.996 0.132 -0.993
µ1 1.0 1.043 0.175 0.994 0.964 0.071 0.955
µ2 1.0 1.043 0.191 1.006 1.005 0.083 1.010
Ch11 2.0 2.011 0.118 1.997 2.011 0.096 2.033
Ch22 2.0 2.013 0.163 2.045 1.985 0.121 1.987
Ch21 -0.5 -0.404 0.230 -0.409 -0.534 0.113 -0.517
σ 0.25 0.249 0.003 0.249 0.354 0.215 0.297
Time (min) 511.2 242.1 436.5 1768.5 285.2 1811.9
Iterations 18.5 8.4 16.0 23.5 3.7 23.5
Successes 20 20
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Table 2.7: Full learning model Monte Carlo results for K = 0
N=100
M = 100 M = 500
Variable True Value Mean SD Median Mean SD Median
µ1 1.0 0.802 0.587 0.600 0.999 0.688 0.742
µ2 1.0 0.696 0.583 0.670 0.960 0.753 0.693
Ch11 2.0 1.505 0.578 1.367 1.808 0.500 1.723
Ch22 2.0 1.676 0.889 1.605 1.623 0.526 1.511
Ch21 -0.5 -0.786 1.124 -0.993 -0.136 1.261 -0.751
σ 0.25 0.379 0.337 0.249 0.235 0.061 0.239
Time (min) 54.0 62.0 27.5 91.3 102.3 61.8
Iterations 143.3 150.7 74 90.7 110.2 59.5
Successes 19 20
N=500
M = 100 M = 500
µ1 1.0 1.059 0.346 1.029 1.132 0.339 1.060
µ2 1.0 0.968 0.326 0.846 1.038 0.330 1.041
Ch11 2.0 2.008 0.281 2.054 2.142 0.307 2.086
Ch22 2.0 1.922 0.364 1.863 2.012 0.366 2.039
Ch21 -0.5 -0.493 0.542 -0.581 -0.344 0.596 -0.461
σ 0.25 0.238 0.051 0.248 0.251 0.017 0.254
Time (min) 64.3 62.6 41.4 239.5 98.2 203.3
Iterations 67.0 69.1 42 53.1 22.6 43.5
Successes 20 20
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Table 2.8: Full learning model Monte Carlo results for K = 1
N=100
M = 100 M = 500
Variable True Value Mean SD Median Mean SD Median
α1 1.0 0.801 0.808 0.667 0.707 0.823 0.743
α2 -1.0 -0.934 0.606 -0.909 -0.762 0.658 -0.763
µ1 1.0 0.816 0.777 0.499 1.010 0.993 0.707
µ2 1.0 1.097 0.975 0.797 1.177 1.007 0.827
Ch11 2.0 1.720 0.739 1.616 2.117 0.771 1.962
Ch22 2.0 1.812 1.106 1.728 1.785 0.697 1.874
Ch21 -0.5 -0.336 1.369 -0.536 0.056 1.540 -0.316
σ 0.25 0.513 0.687 0.264 0.243 0.042 0.248
Time (min) 320.9 389.5 114.6 452.5 270.1 367.2
Iterations 186.2 186.3 88.0 81.8 50.8 67.5
Successes 20 20
N=500
M = 100 M = 500
α1 1.0 0.898 0.286 0.844 0.945 0.319 0.872
α2 -1.0 -0.976 0.258 -0.987 -1.000 0.267 -1.055
µ1 1.0 1.013 0.343 0.932 1.019 0.280 0.960
µ2 1.0 1.053 0.303 1.037 1.044 0.260 1.060
Ch11 2.0 1.950 0.379 1.989 2.081 0.262 2.089
Ch22 2.0 1.871 0.366 1.919 1.934 0.338 1.903
Ch21 -0.5 -0.545 0.481 -0.657 -0.504 0.456 -0.629
σ 0.25 0.275 0.073 0.258 0.249 0.009 0.247
Time (min) 516.4 591.8 331.3 1923.0 1211.7 1399.5
Iterations 66.2 69.6 44.0 52.2 29.7 43.0
Successes 20 19
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CHAPTER 3
DO CONSUMERS’ BELIEFS CONVERGE TO EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTIONS WITH
REPEATED PURCHASES? (CO-AUTHOR FORREST SPENCE)
3.1 Introduction
Price dispersion is a feature of many markets and even occurs in markets for homogeneous goods
or services (Stigler 1961). One possible reason for the persistence of price dispersion is that con-
sumers have limited information over prices and acquiring information may be costly. In markets
with limited information and costly search, an individual may not purchase from the seller with the
lowest price if she is unaware of that price. Theoretical models of consumer search incorporate the
search decision into a model of consumer demand by assuming that individuals have beliefs about
the empirical distribution of prices in the market and must incur a cost to reveal price information
from one or more retailers before deciding whether to purchase the good or service (e.g., Reinganum,
1979; Burdett and Judd, 1983). The decision to search depends upon the magnitude of the search
costs as well as the individual’s subjective beliefs about the distribution of prices. When estimating
models of consumer search, researchers may impose assumptions on individuals’ beliefs in order
to recover estimates of search costs. In this paper, we test the validity of these assumptions using
data on the observed distribution of prices for the online textbook market and data on individuals’
subjective beliefs about this distribution.
There is a growing literature focusing on the development and estimation of structural models
of consumer search. These models have been used to explain observed price dispersion for ho-
mogeneous goods (Hortac¸su and Syverson 2004; Hong and Shum 2006), test competing models of
consumer search (De los Santos, Hortacsu, and Wildenbeest 2012b), and to recover demand esti-
mates in markets where price uncertainty is important (Koulayev 2012; Moraga-Gonza´lez, Sa´ndor,
and Wildenbeest 2009). A critical assumption used in these studies is that consumers have rational
expectations, (i.e. the price of a product is a random variable, but consumers know the parameters
that govern the distribution of prices. However, if consumers have biased beliefs about the param-
eters of the empirical distribution of prices, this will lead to biased estimates of search costs. In
particular, if consumers’ beliefs about prices are biased upward, the rational expectations assump-
tion will bias search cost estimates upwards and bias price elasticity estimates towards zero (low
levels of search can be explained by either high search costs or low expected benefits from search).
By comparing subjective beliefs to actual observed price distributions, we are able to test the validity
of this assumption.
In addition to testing the validity of the rational expectations assumption, we also investigate
the degree to which experienced consumers have more accurate beliefs than their less experienced
counterparts. Recent research has supported this idea by incorporating learning into consumer search
models.1 In these models, consumers learn about the parameters of the empirical price distribution
within a single purchasing decision through a sequential search process (De los Santos, Hortacsu,
and Wildenbeest 2012a; Koulayev 2009, 2013). We focus instead on learning across purchasing
decisions; in particular we examine the hypothesis that more experienced consumers have acquired
information about the empirical price distribution through repeated participation in the market.2
We use data on the empirical distribution of textbook prices from online retailers and consumers’
subjective beliefs about this distribution. In order to obtain data on individuals’ subjective beliefs, we
provide an online questionnaire to 1,224 undergraduate students with multiple textbook purchasing
scenarios in order to elicit their beliefs about prices. For each hypothetical textbook purchasing
scenario, students are given the price of a textbook from the campus bookstore and are asked about
their expectations of the lowest price available from an online retailer. Additional questions are asked
to elicit consumers’ beliefs about the variability of the lowest price. For example, if a consumer
1Earlier studies examined learning and search through experimental designs (e.g., Sonnemans, 1998; Einav, 2005)
2The research questions we address in this paper are further supported by research in the labor literature, which uses
subjective beliefs about future earnings to explain college major choice (Arcidiacono, Hotz, and Kang 2012; Stinebrick-
ner and Stinebrickner 2011; Wiswall and Zafar 2012). These studies show that incorporating students’ subjective beliefs
leads to significantly different estimates than those obtained under the assumption of rational expectations. In addition
to this, Wiswall and Zafar (2012) show that college students’ beliefs about future earnings become more consistent with
the actual earnings distribution as they proceed through school (i.e., become more familiar with their field).
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reports an expected online price of $100, she is then asked about the likelihood that the actual price
is below $95.
Our results show that inexperienced consumers have price expectations that are significantly
greater than the mean of the empirical price distribution for both new and used textbooks. There-
fore, we can reject the hypothesis that inexperienced consumers know the parameters of the price
distribution for the online textbook market. Individuals with higher levels of experience, measured
by the number of prior online textbook purchases, typically have price expectations that are closer to
the empirical mean. For used books, individuals tend to underestimate the variation of the empirical
distribution, and beliefs about the variation of the price distribution do not appear to become more
accurate with experience. Overall, the evidence is consistent with learning, at least for learning about
the mean of the price distribution.
The following section provides theoretical motivation for this project and expands on our goals.
Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 presents results. Section 5 discusses the issue of selection,
and section 6 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Motivation
We use the following simple model of consumer search to motivate the empirical section of this
paper. Individuals can purchase a given product from two locations. Assume for simplicity that the
search cost is zero for one of the locations, so the individual knows the price of the product at this
location. The price of the product at the other location is unknown by the individual, and there is
a cost associated with determining this price. Denote the price at the zero search cost location as
p∗ and the price at the location with a search cost as p, which is a random variable with cumulative
density function, F (p). The individual can either purchase the product from the first location or pay
some cost, c, to search and discover the price at the other location. If the individual decides to search,
he does not incur an additional search cost should he choose to purchase the product from the first
location (i.e., search with recall).
The decision rule for the search problem is given by Equation (3.1). An individual chooses to
search if,
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∫ p∗
0
(
p∗ − p)dF˜i(p) > ci (3.1)
where F˜i denotes an individual’s beliefs about the empirical price distribution. The LHS of Equation
(3.1) is the expected benefit of search. A individual integrates over the difference between the known
(p∗) and unknown price (p), given his beliefs about the distribution of the unknown price. The domain
of integration is bounded above by p∗ because an individual can costlessly revisit the first location
(i.e., the benefit from search is weakly positive).
The RHS of Equation (3.1) is an individual specific search cost ci. The majority of the structural
consumer search literature attempts to recover the distribution of individuals’ search costs. In order
to do so, the econometrician must make assumptions regarding individuals’ beliefs, F˜ . A common
assumption regarding individuals’ beliefs is that there is no learning over the parameters of the
distribution, and individuals have rational expectations. In other words, individuals are assumed to
know the parameters of the distribution of p.3
In this paper, we focus on the first two moments of individuals’ beliefs. Determining if these
moments match the corresponding moments of the empirical price distribution is important for the
estimation of search costs. If consumers overestimate the mean of the empirical price distribution,
then the model will generate an upwardly biased distribution of search costs under the rational ex-
pectations assumption. Similarly, if consumers underestimate the variance of the empirical price
distribution, search cost estimates will also be biased upward.4
An alternative to rational expectations is to allow uncertainty and learning over the parameters
3An alternative to making a parametric assumption on the empirical price distribution and consumers’ beliefs is to
instead assume that consumers form beliefs non-parametrically based on the empirical CDF of observed prices:
F (p) = F˜i(p) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
I[pk < p]
where N is the number of observed prices. If consumers’ beliefs are biased relative to the empirical distribution, this
leads to similar biases in search costs that are discussed under the assumption of a parametric distribution for prices and
beliefs.
4Misspecification of beliefs also leads to biases in price elasticity estimates. If individuals’ beliefs are biased such
that they underestimate the benefit of search (relative to the assumed, true benefit), then the model will recover price
elasticities that are lower relative to the true elasticities.
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of the price distribution. When individuals search and observe a price draw, they can use this infor-
mation to update their beliefs according to a learning process (e.g., Bayesian). Even in the learning
framework, however, some variant of the rational expectations assumption is commonly used to re-
strict individuals’ initial prior beliefs as the initial priors are typically not separately identified. In the
empirical section of the paper we test whether inexperienced individuals have biased beliefs about
the parameters of the price distribution. We also examine whether individuals’ beliefs are consistent
with learning by testing whether more experienced individuals have beliefs that are closer to the
parameters of the empirical price distribution.
3.3 Data
We collected data on subjective beliefs about the distribution of prices in the online textbook
market through online questionnaires sent to students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill (UNC).5 The questionnaires asked individuals about their previous textbook purchasing behavior
and presented them with hypothetical textbook purchasing scenarios. We supplement the responses
to these textbook purchasing scenarios with price data scraped from an online marketplace for a large
number of textbooks. Before providing a summary of both datasets, we will provide more detailed
information about the textbook purchasing scenarios.
3.3.1 Textbook Purchasing Scenarios
Each questionnaire contained three randomly assigned hypothetical textbook purchasing scenarios
from a total of twelve potential scenarios.6 Figure 3.1 is a screenshot of the information provided in
one particular scenario.7
After being presented with information about the scenario, respondents were provided with the
(actual) price of a new copy of the textbook from the campus bookstore, and were asked to give their
5Appendix Section B.1.1 contains the text from the online questionnaire provided to consumers. Individuals who
agreed to participate in the survey were sent a link to the questionnaire.
6These twelve textbooks include four textbooks each from physical sciences, social sciences, and humanities. Of the
four textbooks within these general fields, two are from introductory level courses. More information on the character-
istics of the textbooks used in the hypothetical purchasing scenarios can be found in Appendix B.1.2.
7For each scenario, we randomly assigned respondents to a full information case (title, author, publisher, picture, etc.)
or a limited information case. As opposed to the full information case, as seen in Figure 3.1, the limited information case
only provided information on the title, author, and course.
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expectations about the lowest price they would find for a new copy of this textbook if they searched
only one online retailer.8 Respondents were then presented with the actual price of a used copy of
the textbook from the campus bookstore (including taxes) and were asked to give their expectations
about the lowest price they would find for a used copy online if they searched one online retailer
(including shipping fees).
In order to elicit information about individuals’ beliefs about the higher order moments of the
price distribution, we then asked respondents for the probability that the price realized after search
would be less than X% or greater than Y% of their reported expected price for both new and used
copies of the textbook. For example, in Figure 3.1, the new price of the textbook at the campus
bookstore for the Fall 2012 semester was $87.00. If the respondent reported that her expectation of
the lowest price for a new copy of the textbook from one online retailer was $50.00, then the next
questions would ask her the probability that the price would be less than $45.00 and the probability
that the price would be greater than $55.00. In practice, X was randomly drawn from {85, 90, 95}
and Y was randomly drawn from {105, 110, 115}.
Given that individuals may not be accustomed to thinking about prices in a probabilistic man-
ner, we first presented individuals with an example in order to help clarify the questions within the
textbook purchasing scenarios. In the example, we asked individuals to consider the lowest price
they might find for a pair of jeans if they searched one retailer at the mall. This example contained
information about probabilities (e.g., that their response should be between 0 and 100 percent) and
clarification about the nature of price uncertainty (i.e. that although their best guess might be $20,
there is some chance that the price is actually lower or higher than $20).
3.3.2 Online Questionnaire Data
We conducted two waves of the survey. The first was during the Fall semester of 2012, and the
second was during the Spring semester of 2013. For the Fall 2012 and Spring 2013 semesters, 820
and 798 respondents completed the background questions about their previous textbook purchasing
8The bookstore price provided to students explicitly included sales tax. Respondents were asked to include shipping
fees when providing their expectation of the lowest price available. Respondents were also reminded to not actually
search for the lowest price of the textbook.
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experience, respectively. The sample used in analysis is composed of 739 respondents from the
Fall 2012 semester and 726 respondents from the Spring 2013 semester.9 104 respondents (52 from
both semesters) were dropped because they had been enrolled in college for more than 10 semesters
and an additional 49 respondents (29 from Fall 2012 and 20 from Spring 2013) were dropped for
reporting nonsensical answers (e.g., reporting an expected price of $100,000).10 Appendix B.1.3
provides a more detailed description of within survey attrition.
Table 3.1 displays the number of semesters enrolled for the questionnaire respondents. This
count includes both traditional fall and spring semesters and any summer sessions the students had
previously been enrolled in. Individuals in later semesters are slightly over sampled due to the nature
of how we recruited individuals for the study. We obtained the email addresses of individuals who
participated in a separate, longer running data collection project and agreed to receive follow-up
emails. This other project began in the Fall of 2011 and recruited new individuals each semester.
Individuals who participated at the start of this other project would be at least in their third semester
at the time of data collection (assuming continual enrollment). Appendix B.1.1 provides more detail
on how individuals were recruited.
Respondents’ previous textbook purchasing behavior and major choice are also reported in Table
3.1. A majority of respondents have purchased textbooks at the campus bookstore and from an
online retailer. There is significant variation in how many textbooks respondents have purchased
online; 33.6% of the individuals in the sample have purchased five textbooks or fewer from online
retailers. Approximately a third of respondents reported either Economics or a STEM field as one of
their stated majors.
3.3.3 Online Retailer Data
In order to construct an empirical distribution of prices for textbooks, we used a script in Perl to
scrape .html files from Amazon.com. We collected daily price data for approximately 3,500 books
9There were 240 individuals who participated in both surveys.
10In practice, this was done by removing respondents who reported expectations less than 10% or greater than 150%
of the bookstore price. In Appendix B.2.1 we report out main results for a more relaxed omission criterion. The results
are substantially the same.
71
that were assigned at UNC during the 2012-2013 school year. Using these .html files, we used a
separate script in Perl to parse the lowest prices available for both new and used copies of the books
on each day.11 Since the survey asked individuals about their expectations of the lowest available
price for a particular book, we define the empirical distribution as the distribution of the lowest
online price as a proportion of the price at the campus bookstore across textbooks. We use the daily
price data for two intervals corresponding to the timing of the surveys. The Fall survey period is
from November 30, 2012 to December 10, 2012, and the Spring survey period is from April 11,
2013 to April 26, 2013.12 To construct the empirical price distribution, we use the average price of
the textbook over the survey period. The price sample used in the analysis trims the top and bottom
0.5% of the prices for each survey period.13
The total cost of purchasing books online includes shipping fees, which vary depending on the
speed of delivery. For items purchased on the Amazon Marketplace from third party sellers, we
added the fee for standard shipping. Items purchased directly from Amazon qualify for free standard
shipping as long as the item is purchased in as part of an order that exceeds a certain amount.14 Most
new textbooks will qualify for free shipping if purchased directly from Amazon, so we do not add
any shipping fees to the price of these books.15 We include sales tax in the campus bookstore prices.
Sales taxes are not included in the online prices.16
11Further analysis could incorporate additional prices from these .htmls files such as the lowest price conditional on
reported quality (e.g. very good, good, etc.).
12The online questionnaire was initially distributed on November 30, 2012 for the fall survey and April 11, 2013 for
the spring survey. Nearly all of the surveys were completed during these intervals. We take these periods as the the time
frames that individuals are forming their expectations over. This is potentially problematic as online textbook prices
vary systematically across the year (e.g., they are generally higher in August than May.). Further analysis could examine
additional time frames in the construction of the empirical distribution.
13The trimmed sample excludes books that have an online price listing that is either a very small fraction or a large
multiple of the bookstore price. In some cases, particularly for books with low sales volumes, the automated pricing
algorithms used by larger book resellers can generate these extreme prices.
14Orders that exceeded $25 qualified for free shipping at the time of the surveys.
15We do not include shipping for books that do not individually qualify for free shipping because they could be
purchased as part of a larger order that does qualify for free shipping. The empirical analysis focuses on higher priced
books that would qualify for free shipping. All of the books in the hypothetical textbook purchasing scenarios qualify
for free shipping if purchased new from Amazon.
16At the time of this analysis, Amazon did not collect sales taxes. Individuals were responsible for paying the sales
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Table 3.2 provides the ratio of prices of textbooks from Amazon.com relative to the price from
the campus bookstore. The first row reports the prices of new books for the full sample of books
for which we have data. On average, new prices on Amazon.com are approximately 85% of the
bookstore price. The second to last column reports the average difference between the price of the
textbook from the bookstore and an online retailer. For all textbooks in our sample, the savings in
absolute terms is approximately $10.
The second row reports the new prices that includes new books listed on the Amazon market-
place by third party sellers. Including the marketplace listings increases the savings relative to the
bookstore price. On average, used prices on Amazon.com are approximately 76% of the used book-
store price. This corresponds to an average difference of approximately $33. The median is lower
than the mean for both new and used books, as the distributions are slightly skewed to the right. On
average the prices during the Spring survey period were slightly lower than during the Fall period.
The next three rows of Table 3.2 provide summary statistics for textbooks which are priced
greater than $100 for a new copy from the campus bookstore. Books with a list price below $100
include popular press titles that have a large market outside of being assigned for a college course.
The restricted sample of books which are priced greater than $100 at the campus bookstore consists
primarily of books that are commonly thought of as textbooks. Relative to the full sample, the
potential savings from shopping online becomes greater for both new books and used books (i.e. in
both percentage and magnitude terms, more expensive textbooks have greater savings in the online
market). The variability of prices is less for both new and used books relative to the full sample.
The final three rows provide summary statistics for the textbooks used in the hypothetical textbook
purchasing scenarios.17 On average, these prices are slightly lower than the sample of textbooks with
a price of $100 or more at the campus bookstore, but the difference is not significant.
Ideally, how we define the empirical price distribution should match the price distribution of
the individuals’ beliefs, but there are a few reasons why this may not be the case. First, textbook
taxes for online purchases, however compliance was low. Sellers on the Amazon Marketplace are responsible for paying
any applicable sales taxes, so sales taxes are already included in the listed prices.
17Note that the total number of textbooks in the purchasing scenarios is actually 12. However, online retailer data for
one textbook is missing.
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prices vary over time, and the time frame used to define the empirical distribution may not match
the time frame of the individuals’ subjective beliefs. Second, we only use price data from a single
online retailer. We believe the prices from Amazon.com provide a reasonable approximation to the
empirical distribution of prices that consumers face if they only search one online retailer. Of the
individuals in our sample, 75% reported Amazon.com as the first website they would visit to search
for a textbook. These issues of timing and alternative retailers affect the comparison between the
individuals’ subjective beliefs and the empirical price distribution. The comparison of individuals’
subjective beliefs across different levels of experience is not affected as long as individuals with
different levels of experience do not systematically differ in the time frame considered or in the
choice of the online retailer.
3.4 Results
The first subsection presents results using the data on reported expectations. The following sub-
section incorporates additional data on beliefs to examine not only individuals’ expectations but also
individuals’ beliefs about the variance of the empirical price distribution in the context of a paramet-
ric learning model. The online survey asks individuals to report what they thought the price of the
textbook would be if they searched one online retailer. We interpret the responses to this question as
corresponding to individuals’ subjective beliefs about the mean of the price distribution of the lowest
price for a particular textbook.
3.4.1 Expectations Results
In this section we present descriptive statistics of individuals’ price expectations. Then, we test for
differences in price expectations relative to the empirical prices across levels of experience in order
to determine if consumers’ expectations converge to the mean of the empirical price distribution.
Finally, we perform regressions to control for additional characteristics of the respondents and the
textbook scenarios.
The first columns of table 3.3 provide the summary statistics of the reported expectations of
the lowest online price as a proportion of the bookstore price for individuals with different levels
of online textbook purchasing experience. In the survey, individuals were asked about the number
of textbooks they had ever purchased online, and they responded by selecting one of four possible
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categories. Individuals with no prior online textbook purchases expect the price of a used book online
to be approximately 74% of the price of a used book at the college bookstore. This corresponds to
an expected savings of $31.53 on average across the hypothetical textbook purchasing scenarios.
Individuals with prior online textbook purchases expect the online price to be lower, with higher
levels of experience corresponding with a greater expected savings. On average, individuals with
more than ten previous online purchases expect the price of a used book online to be approximately
65% of the price of a used book at the college bookstore. This corresponds to an average savings of
$41.65. The results from the spring survey display a similar pattern.
Table 3.4 repeats the analysis done in table 3.3 using level differences instead of the normalized
price ratio. Consumers across experience levels expect for there to be an average savings of $30 to
$40 for textbooks from online retailers. The patterns across experience levels are the same when
using levels as using ratios. As consumers gain experience, they expect to find larger savings in the
online market.
These results demonstrate that higher levels of experience are associated with lower expectations
of online textbook prices. This relationship would be consistent with learning if the individuals
with higher levels of experience report expectations that are closer to the true mean of the price
distributions. The final two columns of table 3.3 report the difference between the average of the
reported expectations and the mean of the empirical price distribution for the sample of scenario
textbooks as well as the sample of textbooks with a list price greater than $100. On average, the
reported expectations become closer to the empirical mean at higher levels of experience. For the
scenario textbooks, the difference between the mean of the reported expectations and the empirical
mean is not significant at any level of experience.18 For the sample of books with list price greater
than $100 for the fall survey, this difference is significant at the lowest levels of experience and is
not significant at the higher levels of significance. For the spring survey, the difference between the
mean of the reported expectations and the mean of the empirical price distribution is significant at
all levels of experience for books with a list price greater than $100. This is due to the mean of the
18This result is primarily due to the small sample size for the scenario textbooks.
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empirical price distribution being lower during the spring survey period.
Table 3.5 reports the results for new books. Individuals with higher levels of experience report
lower expected prices on average. Individuals with no experience expect the online price to be 83%
of the price of the textbook from the campus bookstore (a $26.67 average savings). Individuals with
eleven or more previous online purchases expect the online price to be 77% of the price from the
campus bookstore (a $37.58 average savings). The difference between the empirical mean and the
mean of the reported expectations decreases for higher levels of experience. However, unlike the
results for used books, individuals with higher levels of experience have expectations that are on
average significantly below the empirical prices. One explanation for this result is that the new price
is the price for purchasing the book directly from Amazon.com. When the new price is defined as the
minimum of the marketplace price and the price charged by Amazon.com, the reported expectations
are significantly greater than the empirical mean for all levels of experience. Some individuals likely
include the marketplace when forming their beliefs about the prices of new textbooks. One possible
explanation for the relationship between experience and price expectations for new books is that
individuals are learning about the availability of new textbooks by third party sellers.
Due to the nature of the data collection, we want to control for differences in the textbook pur-
chasing scenarios that individuals are given and control for additional characteristics of the individual
which may explain the differences in price expectations across levels of experience. Table 3.6 re-
ports results from a regression of normalized price expectations on level of experience, textbook
characteristics, scenario characteristics and additional individual controls. The scenario characteris-
tics include indicators to control for the different possible scenarios, the survey period, and whether
the textbook purchasing scenario was a full information case (details were provided on textbook
characteristics such as years since revision, etc.). The additional individual controls include indica-
tors for whether the individual has previously taken the course for which the textbook was assigned
and whether the individual has previously been assigned the textbook in the scenario.
The regression estimates are consistent with the mean comparisons above. Individuals who have
never made an online textbook purchase before have significantly higher price expectations than in-
dividuals who have purchased a textbook online. Price expectations evolve gradually, as individuals
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in the highest category of experience consistently have lower expectations.
The coefficients on indicators for whether the respondent had previously taken the course or been
assigned the textbook are consistently negative, but only statistically significant for individuals who
had previously taken the course. The coefficient on the number of years since the last revision is neg-
ative and significant, perhaps reflecting beliefs about a greater supply of textbooks in the secondary
market. As the number of years since a textbook has been revised increases, the supply of textbooks
in the secondary market increases, generally reducing the price of the textbook. Consumers seem to
internalize this when making a textbook purchasing decision, which supports the results in Chevalier
and Goolsbee (2009). Similarly, consumers have higher price expectations for textbooks that are the
latest edition released (two of the twelve textbook scenarios were for previous editions).
Table 3.7 reports regression results with year in school dummies. These results show that the
differences in beliefs are due to differences in direct online textbook purchasing experience rather
than from indirect experience (e.g., word of mouth).
3.4.2 Distribution Results
In this subsection, we examine whether the patterns observed in the data are consistent with learn-
ing over additional parameters/moments of the empirical price distribution. In the hypothetical text-
book purchasing scenarios, individuals report their expectations for prices as well as the probability
that a draw from the price distribution is below a given threshold (E[H] and Fp(pL;µ, σ)). We use
these two moments to calculate the expected parameters of each individual’s beliefs (i.e., E[µ] and
E[σ]), under the assumption that individuals believe that prices follow a log-normal distribution.19
The log normal distribution has two properties that make it an appropriate distribution in the current
context. First, the support of the distribution is non-negative real numbers and prices are bounded
below by zero. The second feature is that the log normal distribution is skewed to the right, which is
a feature of both the reported beliefs in the sample and the empirical distribution. The most impor-
tant criteria is that the beliefs (i.e., prior and posterior distributions) of the distribution parameters
19The parameters of the log-normal distribution this is done by using the following equations for the mean and CDF of
a log-normal random variable: E[H] = exp(µ+ σ
2
2 ), and Fp(pL;µ, σ) = Φ(
log(p)−µ
σ ), where Φ is the standard normal
CDF.
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are conjugate distributions, which is necessary for tractably modeling a Bayesian learning process.
The results are similar under alternative distributional assumptions.20
Assuming that individuals believe that the distribution of prices is log-normal, then individuals’
prior distribution on µ and 1
σ2
is Normal-Gamma. If the individual searches, she observes a price
which she uses to update her beliefs. As the number of price observations increases, the individual’s
mean prior on µ and σ converge to the true parameters, and the variance of the priors converge to
zero. In terms of the search problem, evidence of individual learning requires that individuals with
more experience in the market (i.e., more observations of prices) have more accurate beliefs about
the true parameters of the price distribution and more certainty in their beliefs.
Denote the individual’s expected parameters as µi and σi. In the analysis, we consider the dis-
tribution of the individual’s expected parameters in the population. Define µ¯e and σ¯e as the mean
of individuals’ beliefs with the same level of experience e (i.e. µ¯e = 1
Ne
∑
i µi ∗ 1[ei = e] and
σ¯e = 1
Ne
∑
i σi ∗ 1[ei = e]). Similarly, define V ar[µ]e and V ar[σ]e as the variance among individ-
uals’ beliefs with experience level e. As the number of signals the individual receives increases, the
expected parameters should converge to the true price distribution parameters. Since each individ-
ual’s beliefs converge to the true parameters, µ¯e and σ¯e should converge to the true parameters as
e increases. The convergence of each individual’s beliefs to the true parameters as experience in-
creases implies that the variance among individuals’ beliefs goes to zero. However, at low levels of
experience, V ar[µ]e and V ar[σ]e may increase depending on the variance among individuals’ initial
prior beliefs. If individuals have similar initial mean priors, then the signal noise would generate
greater dispersion of individuals’ beliefs for low levels of experience.
Table 3.8 reports the summary statistics for the reported probability that a draw from the price
distribution is below some threshold for different levels of the threshold. The threshold is defined as
a fraction of the individual’s reported expectation. On average, individuals report that the likelihood
of the lowest price being less than 85% of their expected lowest price is 0.298. For higher levels of
the threshold, individuals assign a larger probability that the price is below the threshold.
20The results for the gamma and normal distributions are presented in the Appendix.
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Some individuals report a probability of zero or 100 which cannot be justified given the distribu-
tional assumption. Similarly, reported probabilities close to zero or 100 will only fit the distribution
for extreme values of the parameters. Once the parameter values are calculated, individuals with
parameter values in the top or bottom 2.5% of parameter values for either parameter are dropped
from the sample to reduce the impact of outliers.21
In order to make the interpretation of the results more straightforward, we use the individual’s
distribution parameters to calculate the mean and standard deviation of the individual’s expected
price distribution, which is defined as the distribution with the individual’s expected parameter val-
ues.22 Table 3.9 reports the sample mean and standard deviation of these moments of the individual’s
expected price distribution by level of experience. Differences in the mean values from the analysis
in the previous section is due to the different samples that result from the different rejection crite-
ria. The mean and standard deviation of the preferred specifications of the empirical distribution are
presented for comparison.
For used books, the variability of the mean across individuals with the same level of experience
does not decrease for individuals with the highest level of experience. So there is greater variability
in the expected lowest price for individuals with the highest level of experience. One reason for the
greater variability for the highest category of experience is that there may be greater variability in
the underlying level of experience for individuals in this group since it includes a larger range of the
number of previous textbook purchases. The mean of the standard deviation of the expected price
distribution initially increases with experience (from 0.238 for individuals with no online purchases
to 0.250 for individuals with 1 to 5 online purchases) and then decreases with experience for higher
levels of experience. The variability of the standard deviation of the expected price distribution
across individuals with the same level of experience tends to decrease for higher levels of experience,
21Probabilities of zero and 100 are replaced with 1 and 99 respectively. The individuals who report probabilities of
zero or 100 are included in the 2.5%. For the normal distribution, the initial sample only includes individuals who report
a probability less than 50%.
22Note that individuals’ two responses for each scenario exactly identify their expectations of the mean and variance
of the normalized price distribution.
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which is consistent with learning. The significance levels reported for the mean are from a two-
sample equality of means test that compares individuals within a particular experience group to
everyone not in that group. The test for the equality of variances defines the comparison samples
in the same way. For new books, the standard deviation of the expected price distributions and
its variability within experience groups display similar patterns as for used books. However, the
significance of these patterns is less.
Comparing the beliefs about the standard deviation of the price distribution to the empirical
standard deviation suggests that individuals may underestimate the variability of prices for used
books and overestimate the variability of prices for new books. For used books, however, individuals’
beliefs about the mean of the standard deviation decrease at higher levels of experience, moving
farther away from the empirical standard deviation. There are several possible explanations for this
result. First, our construction of the empirical price distribution may overstate the variability of prices
by including erroneous product listings (e.g., sellers listing old editions or international editions).
Also, the empirical distribution we construct may not be representative of the books encountered by
the typical student since we include all books that are assigned at the university. Another explanation
is the inherent difficulty in eliciting beliefs about variance as individuals may not be accustomed to
thinking in probabilistic terms.
Figure 3.2 shows the density function of the log-normal distribution for the mean of the individual
parameter values as well as the empirical distribution. Moving from the group with no experience to
the group with some experience (1 to 5 online textbook purchases), the price distribution shifts to the
left and the variance increases slightly. The distributions for higher levels of experience are similar
to the group with some experience but have lower variance. This is in contrast to the empirical distri-
bution, which displays much more variability than the beliefs. Although individuals with experience
are more accurate in predicting the mean of the distribution, even high experience individuals tend to
place too little weight in the left tail of the price distribution. Figure 3.3 shows the densities for new
books. As experience increases, the variance of the distributions decreases. Similar to used books,
individuals tend to understate the variability of the empirical distribution but to a lesser degree.
Overall, the evidence is consistent with learning, although the evidence suggests incomplete
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learning. It may be the case that individuals are only learning over a single parameter. This would
explain why individuals with more experience are better able to predict the mean price, but are no
better (and are actually worse for used books) in incorporating the variance of the price distribu-
tion into their beliefs. Another possibility is that individuals in the sample do not have sufficient
experience for the convergence properties of the learning process to be evident.
3.4.3 Price Beliefs by Major
In this section, we test whether there are differences in individuals’ beliefs for STEM majors
and non-STEM majors. The STEM majors include the natural sciences, math, and other quantitative
fields (including Economics). Individuals with multiple majors are categorized as STEM majors if
any of their majors are in a STEM field. Table 3.10 reports the average expected price for STEM
and non-STEM majors. For both new and used books, there is not a significant difference between
the price expectations for individuals with no prior online purchases. For used books, this difference
becomes significant at low levels of experience as the price expectations of STEM majors decreases
at a faster rate. At higher levels of experience, the price expectations of non-STEM majors appears
to “catch up” to the price expectations of STEM majors and the difference is significant at the 10%
level. For new books, the difference in price expectations between STEM and non-STEM majors is
only significant at the highest level of experience.
Table 3.11 presents the average standard deviation of the expected price distribution for STEM
and non-STEM majors by level of experience. STEM majors tend to have lower expectations about
the variability of prices and there is little change in the expected price variation across different
levels of experience. For non-STEM majors, the variation in the expected price distribution initially
increases at the lowest level of experience and decreases at the higher levels of experience. This
pattern holds for both new and used books.
The results suggest that individuals in non-STEM majors may incorporate new information about
the price distribution differently from STEM majors. The mean of the expected price distribution
is higher than the mean of the empirical distribution for individuals with no online purchasing ex-
perience regardless of major. If these individuals with no experience search for a textbook online,
they are likely to observe a price that is lower than the mean of their expected price distribution. On
81
average, STEM majors incorporate this initial experience by lowering the mean of their expected
price distribution while non-STEM majors increase the variance of their expected price distribution.
The results from this section should be interpreted with some caution as there are other factors
that may cause the reported beliefs about the price distribution to differ by major. First, STEM
majors may more comfortable answering the kind of probabilistic questions that we ask in the survey.
Second, the types of books purchased may be systematically different.
3.5 Learning vs. Selection
Although the evidence is consistent with learning, the differences in individuals’ beliefs across
levels of experience could also result from selection. If individuals have heterogeneous initial prior
beliefs, then individuals who believe that the online price is similar to the bookstore price will not
search and will not purchase their books online. Then, if the individuals whose initial priors are
close to the true distribution are the ones who search and purchase online, the observed difference in
beliefs would be the result of selection based on the initial difference in beliefs and not because of
learning.
To distinguish between the effects of learning and selection, we examine the individuals who
participated in the survey in both the fall and spring semesters. There were 240 individuals who
participated in both surveys. Of these individuals, 89 reported an increase in their level of online
textbook purchasing experience from the fall to the spring survey. If selection is generating the
observed patterns in the data, then the individuals who report an increase in experience in the spring
would have lower expected online prices in the fall than the individuals who do not have an increase
in experience. Alternatively, in order for the data to be consistent with learning, then individuals
who report an increase in experience should be more likely to report different beliefs in the spring,
whereas the beliefs of individuals who do not report an increase in experience should be similar in
both periods. For the prior online purchase experience measure, we restrict the analysis to the 22
individuals (between 47 and 56 scenarios) who report no experience in the fall survey. Since this
measure of experience is an interval, individuals who remain in the same interval for both fall and
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spring may or may not have gained experience.23 The inherent limitation of this test is that one
period of learning may not generate a significant difference in beliefs for those whose experience
increased. Therefore, this test is primarily a test of the hypothesis of no selection.
Table 3.12 reports the mean parameter values for a log-normal distribution of prices for the two
groups for both surveys as well as the mean change in parameter values between surveys. The results
of the two-sample t-tests comparing each of the mean values between groups are also reported.
There is not a significant difference between the mean parameter values of the two groups in the fall
semester for both new and used books. The only difference that is significant is the difference in the
value of σ for used books in the fall compared to the spring. However, this change is significant for
both groups. These results suggest that selection is not the primary cause of the differences in beliefs
across experience levels. However, due to the limited sample size, no definitive conclusion can be
drawn.
3.6 Conclusion
Although the evidence is consistent with learning, it appears that the learning process is incom-
plete. Even individuals with the highest levels of experience on average do not fully converge to the
empirical distribution. Also, many individuals with high levels of experience have inaccurate beliefs
(i.e., the variation across individuals’ beliefs does not converge to zero). There are three primary
explanations for the persistence of inaccurate beliefs. The first is that the level of experience where
this convergence would occur is beyond what we measure in the data. The second is that the beliefs
are converging to a distribution other than what is observed during the sample period. For much of
the year, the prices of these textbooks online are relatively stable. For a few weeks prior to the start
of the semester, prices rise sharply and peak around the first week of the semester. Since individuals
are likely to purchase textbooks during this period, the signal that they receive will be from a dis-
tribution with a higher mean than what is observed during the sample period. If an individual only
ever purchases books online during the first week of the semester (the time when online prices are
greatest), then a high experience individual may expect that potential savings online are relatively
23The results of the test are the same if the sample is not limited to individuals who report no experience in the fall.
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modest. Finally, there is likely to be some noise in the reported data as individuals may have differed
in their interpretation of questions as well as the amount of consideration given to their responses.
One limitation of this analysis is the problem of external validity. Although the online market
for textbooks is comparable to online markets for other goods, the individuals in our sample are not
representative of consumers in other online markets. Relative to consumers in other online markets,
individuals in our sample are likely to be younger with higher intellectual ability, but they may have
less overall experience in online markets. If there are knowledge spillovers across online markets,
i.e. if experience in one online market causes individuals to have more accurate beliefs about the
prices in other online markets, then the observed bias in the initial beliefs may be more pronounced
in the online textbook market, where individuals are likely to have less overall experience in online
markets.
In this paper we use a novel dataset to examine subjective price beliefs and their relationship
with experience in a market. We find that inexperienced consumers have biased beliefs, but that
consumers appear to be learning about the empirical price distribution as they repeatedly participate
in the market. This study also leaves open a wide avenue for future research. First, since we do not
estimate a dynamic model of search and learning, we are not able to show how individuals incorpo-
rate their beliefs into the search decision. Thus, we are not able to determine whether individuals
incorporate the benefits of the additional information obtained through search for future purchasing
decisions in their decision to search. Also, if individuals have heterogeneous initial prior beliefs, one
potential avenue of future research would be to determine the sources of this heterogeneity. Finally,
future research is needed to justify the distributional assumptions on the empirical distribution as
well as the prior beliefs.
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Figure 3.1: Textbook Purchasing Scenario
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Table 3.1: Respondent Characteristics
Proportion
1 - 2 Semesters 0.143
3 - 4 Semesters 0.248
5 - 6 Semesters 0.242
7 or More Semesters 0.369
Ever Purchased at Campus Bookstore 0.960
Never Purchased Online 0.106
Purchased 1 - 5 Online 0.230
Purchased 6 - 10 Online 0.241
Purchased 11 or More Online 0.423
STEM Major 0.280
Economics Major 0.089
Other Major 0.631
N = 1465
Table 3.2: Ratio of Amazon Prices to Bookstore Prices by Survey Period
Fall Survey Period
Mean Ratio S.D. Min Median Max Mean Diff. ($) N
All Books New 0.857 0.156 0.467 0.850 1.432 9.37 2051
Newalt 0.772 0.236 0.206 0.753 2.877 20.05 2220
Used 0.758 0.383 0.091 0.715 4.207 16.24 2129
Bookstore New 0.825 0.142 0.475 0.829 1.222 28.33 405
Price > $100 Newalt 0.678 0.169 0.206 0.673 1.377 57.29 429
Used 0.657 0.246 0.097 0.659 1.348 46.03 390
Scenario Books New 0.788 0.112 0.600 0.802 0.961 31.07 11
Newalt 0.659 0.136 0.514 0.609 0.861 61.48 11
Used 0.609 0.241 0.151 0.578 0.979 45.81 11
Spring Survey Period
Mean Ratio S.D. Min Median Max Mean Diff. ($) N
All Books New 0.834 0.148 0.357 0.838 1.425 10.99 2023
Newalt 0.755 0.295 0.202 0.737 3.970 21.64 2248
Used 0.735 0.441 0.080 0.684 5.675 18.57 2161
Bookstore New 0.795 0.158 0.358 0.815 1.326 34.02 379
Price > $100 Newalt 0.646 0.219 0.216 0.658 1.804 62.39 434
Used 0.597 0.279 0.085 0.602 1.731 54.57 390
Scenario Books New 0.729 0.120 0.524 0.768 0.879 46.57 11
Newalt 0.607 0.169 0.275 0.593 0.853 66.80 11
Used 0.614 0.255 0.123 0.581 0.919 50.26 11
Notes: The ratio reported is the lowest price on Amazon.com divided by the price
of the same title (of equivalent quality) from the campus bookstore. Newalt refers
to the lowest price listed by marketplace sellers for a new copy of the title.
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Table 3.3: Mean Ratio Comparisons by Online Purchasing Experience, Used Books
Fall
Expectation / Bookstore Price Mean Expectation Bias
Experience N Mean Ratio S.D. Median Scenario Books Books > $100
No online purchases 256 0.735 0.204 0.750 0.126 0.078***
1-5 online purchases 478 0.714 0.191 0.744 0.105 0.057***
6-10 online purchases 477 0.663 0.172 0.683 0.054 0.006
11+ online purchases 810 0.645 0.184 0.645 0.036 -0.012
Spring
Expectation / Bookstore Price Mean Expectation Bias
Experience N Mean Ratio S.D. Median Scenario Books Books > $100
No online purchases 182 0.744 0.198 0.761 0.130 0.147***
1-5 online purchases 439 0.710 0.170 0.745 0.097 0.113***
6-10 online purchases 480 0.703 0.173 0.741 0.089 0.106***
11+ online purchases 888 0.660 0.176 0.675 0.046 0.063***
Notes: The ratio reported is an individual’s expectation of the lowest price from an online retailer
divided by the price of the same title from the campus bookstore. Expectation Bias refers to the
difference between this ratio and the ratio of the observed online price to the bookstore price.
* refers to t–test p–values < .1; ** < .05; *** < .01; H0 = No difference between ratios.
Table 3.4: Mean Difference Comparisons by Online Purchasing Experience, Used Books
Fall
Bookstore Price - Expected Price Mean Expectation Bias
Experience N Mean Diff. S.D. Median Scenario Books Books > $100
No online purchases 256 31.55 29.86 28 14.26 14.48***
1-5 online purchases 478 35.02 30.51 27.5 10.79 11.01***
6-10 online purchases 477 40.37 30.79 31 5.44 5.66
11+ online purchases 810 41.73 30.78 31 4.08 4.30
Spring
Bookstore Price - Expected Price Mean Expectation Bias
Experience N Mean Diff. S.D. Median Scenario Books Books > $100
No online purchases 182 32.16 29.52 27.5 18.10 22.41 ***
1-5 online purchases 439 35.22 28.56 28 15.04 19.33 ***
6-10 online purchases 480 35.97 27.75 28.5 14.29 18.59 ***
11+ online purchases 888 41.28 31.09 31 8.98 13.29 ***
Notes: The difference reported is an individual’s expectation of the lowest price from an online retailer
subtracted from the price of the same title from the campus bookstore. Expectation Bias refers to the
difference between this difference and the difference of the observed bookstore price to the online price.
* refers to t–test p–values < .1; ** < .05; *** < .01; H0 = No difference between differences.
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Table 3.5: Mean Ratio Comparisons by Online Purchasing Experience, New Books
Fall
Expectation / Bookstore Price Mean Expectation Bias
Scenario Books Books > $100
Experience N Mean Ratio S.D. Median New Newalt New Newalt
No online purchases 256 0.834 0.164 0.853 0.046 0.174*** 0.008 0.156***
1-5 online purchases 479 0.819 0.155 0.851 0.032 0.160*** -0.006 0.142***
6-10 online purchases 480 0.778 0.171 0.817 0.010 0.119** -0.048*** 0.100***
11+ online purchases 814 0.768 0.159 0.798 -0.020 0.109** -0.058*** 0.090***
Spring
Expectation / Bookstore Price Mean Expectation Bias
Scenario Books Books > $100
Experience N Mean Ratio S.D. Median New Newalt New Newalt
No online purchases 184 0.835 0.183 0.870 0.103** 0.225*** 0.037** 0.186***
1-5 online purchases 444 0.818 0.150 0.856 0.089** 0.210*** 0.023** 0.171***
6-10 online purchases 486 0.788 0.152 0.822 0.059 0.180*** -0.008 0.141***
11+ online purchases 892 0.772 0.155 0.795 0.043 0.164*** -0.023** 0.126***
Notes: The ratio reported is an individual’s expectation of the lowest price from an online retailer divided
by the price of the same title from the campus bookstore. Expectation Bias refers to the difference
between this ratio and the ratio of the observed online price to the bookstore price.
* refers to t–test p–value < .1; ** < .05; *** < .01; H0 = No difference between ratios.
Figure 3.2: Used price pdf versus empirical dist. by level of experience
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Table 3.6: (Online Expectation / Bookstore Price) Regressed on Prev. Purchases
(1) (2)
New Used New Used
1 - 5 Online Purchases -0.014 -0.026 -0.015 -0.028*
(0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017)
6 - 10 Online Purchases -0.051*** -0.058*** -0.052*** -0.059***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017)
11+ Online Purchases -0.063*** -0.087*** -0.063*** -0.088***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016)
Previously Taken Course -0.037*** -0.027** -0.022* -0.025*
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Previously Assigned Book 0.006 -0.005 -0.008 -0.017
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Introductory Course -0.009 0.003 · ·
(0.006) (0.008) · ·
Latest Edition 0.007 0.028** -0.006 -0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016)
Years Since Last Revision -0.001* -0.004*** -0.002* -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Hardback -0.009 -0.005 0.004 -0.016
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Book Fixed Effects No Yes
Notes: Clustered standard errors (on the individual) given in parentheses. Also
included: full information indicator, Spring indicator, pages, and weight.
* refers to p–value < .1; ** < .05; *** < .01
Figure 3.3: New price pdf versus empirical dist. by level of experience
Newalt is the minimum price for a new textbook from Amazon or Amazon Marketplace.
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Table 3.7: (Online Expectation / Bookstore Price) Regressed on Experience
(1) (2)
New Used New Used
1 - 5 Online Purchases -0.019 -0.026 -0.020 -0.027
(0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017)
6 - 10 Online Purchases -0.058*** -0.054*** -0.060*** -0.058***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016)
11+ Online Purchases -0.076*** -0.084*** -0.077*** -0.087***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016)
Second Year 0.018 -0.018 0.019 -0.013
(0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015)
Third Year 0.026* -0.012 0.026* -0.007
(0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Four and Above 0.040*** -0.005 0.040*** -0.002
(0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015)
Additional Controls No Yes
Notes: Clustered standard errors (on the individual) given in parentheses. Additional
controls include scenario f.e.s, full information ind., Spring indicator, pages, weight,
prev. taken, prev. assigned, latest edition ind., hardback ind. and years since revision.
Second year denotes an indicator for individuals in their 3rd or 4th semester, etc.
* refers to p–value < .1; ** < .05; *** < .01
Table 3.8: Reported Probability that Lowest Price < b ∗ Expected Lowest Price
Used
b N Mean S.D. Min Median Max
0.85 1352 0.298 0.187 0 0.250 0.95
0.90 1368 0.328 0.189 0 0.300 1.00
0.95 1283 0.359 0.198 0 0.300 1.00
New
b N Mean S.D. Min Median Max
0.85 1359 0.271 0.176 0 0.250 1.00
0.90 1376 0.312 0.190 0 0.300 1.00
0.95 1293 0.339 0.195 0 0.300 1.00
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Table 3.9: Mean and Variance Comparisons (Log-Normal Assumption)
Used
Empirical Distribution
N Mean S.D.
pBookstore > $100 390 0.657 0.246
Scenario Books 11 0.609 0.241
Beliefs
Experience N Mean Ei(p) S.D. Ei(p) Mean
√
Vari(p) S.D.
√
Vari(p)
No online purchases 370 0.713*** 0.166* 0.238 0.384
1-5 online purchases 819 0.703*** 0.166 0.250** 0.362**
6-10 online purchases 884 0.682 0.167* 0.230 0.332
11+ online purchases 1577 0.652*** 0.171*** 0.204*** 0.284***
New
Empirical Distribution
N Mean S.D.
Bkstr. Price > $100 405 0.825 0.142
Scenario Books 11 0.788 0.112
Beliefs
Experience N Mean Ei(p) S.D. Ei(p) Mean
√
Vari(p) S.D.
√
Vari(p)
No online purchases 371 0.813*** 0.151 0.232 0.300
1-5 online purchases 815 0.809*** 0.145** 0.246** 0.346*
6-10 online purchases 872 0.783 0.151 0.222 0.304
11+ online purchases 1535 0.769*** 0.149 0.215* 0.289
Notes: The significance levels reported for the mean values are from a two-sample equality of
means test. The significance levels for the standard deviations are from Brown and Forsythe’s
alternative formulation of Levene’s robust two-sample equality of variances test.
* refers to p–value < .1; ** < .05; *** < .01
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Table 3.10: Mean Comparison by Major
Used Books
STEM majors Non-STEM majors
Experience N Mean Ei(p) N Mean Ei(p) p-value
No online purchases 117 0.703 (0.167) 252 0.718 (0.166) 0.429
1-5 online purchases 314 0.681 (0.174) 505 0.716 (0.160) 0.004
6-10 online purchases 323 0.667 (0.175) 560 0.692 (0.161) 0.036
11+ online purchases 598 0.642 (0.171) 979 0.657 (0.171) 0.093
New Books
No online purchases 118 0.820 (0.143) 259 0.811 (0.154) 0.568
1-5 online purchases 320 0.801 (0.149) 508 0.814 (0.144) 0.245
6-10 online purchases 321 0.787 (0.150) 563 0.779 (0.155) 0.426
11+ online purchases 596 0.754 (0.148) 966 0.777 (0.152) 0.003
Notes: The p-value is from a two-sample equality of means test.
Standard deviation in parentheses.
Table 3.11: Variance Comparison by Major (Log-Normal Assumption)
Used Books
STEM majors Non-STEM majors
Experience N Mean
√
Vari(p) N Mean
√
Vari(p) p-value
No online purchases 117 0.220 (0.387) 252 0.248 (0.384) 0.528
1-5 online purchases 314 0.207 (0.224) 505 0.276 (0.424) 0.003
6-10 online purchases 323 0.215 (0.292) 560 0.240 (0.353) 0.249
11+ online purchases 598 0.209 (0.292) 979 0.202 (0.279) 0.642
New Books
No online purchases 118 0.203 (0.290) 259 0.252 (0.336) 0.153
1-5 online purchases 320 0.213 (0.292) 508 0.278 (0.421) 0.009
6-10 online purchases 321 0.231 (0.326) 563 0.222 (0.322) 0.699
11+ online purchases 596 0.201 (0.270) 966 0.225 (0.316) 0.114
Notes: The p-value is from a two-sample equality of means test.
Standard deviation in parentheses.
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Used Books
Fall Spring Difference
Group N mean µi mean σi N mean µi mean σi mean µi mean σi
Increase Exp. 48 -0.447 (0.321) 0.297 (0.307) 47 -0.412 (0.356) 0.199 (0.169) 0.034 -0.098*
Same Exp. 55 -0.479 (0.363) 0.342 (0.372) 54 -0.446 (0.299) 0.230 (0.255) 0.034 -0.111*
Difference 0.033 -0.045 0.034 -0.032
New Books
Fall Spring Difference
Group N mean µi mean σi N mean µi mean σi mean µi mean σi
Increase Exp. 45 -0.243 (0.163) 0.216 (0.148) 50 -0.294 (0.274) 0.240 (0.276) 0.051 -0.024
Same Exp. 56 -0.302 (0.289) 0.277 (0.279) 53 -0.288 (0.217) 0.246 (0.221) -0.014 0.031
Difference 0.059 -0.060 -0.005 -0.006
Table 3.12: Parameter Values by Change in Experience
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR EXPLAINING YOUTH SMOKING INITIATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A
RATIONAL ADDITION MODEL WITH LEARNING
A.1 Data Appendix
Table A.1 presents the summary statistics by year for the sample of individuals who are observed
in every wave of the survey. The proportion of individuals who smoke increases over the first few
waves. The proportion of smokers peaks at around 36% in 2002 and remains in the low 30’s for the
rest of the sample period.
A.2 Estimation Appendix
A.2.1 CCP Representation and Finite Dependence
When the preference shock is GEV, the future value term in the conditional value function has
a closed form solution. With type I EV errors, the future value term can be expressed as the one
period ahead CCP and conditional value function of any alternative. The closed form expression of
the future value term is:
E[max
j
vjt+1] = log(
J∑
k=1
ev
k
t+1) + e.c. (A.1)
where e.c. is Euler’s constant.1 To express the future value term in terms of the conditional value
function and CCP of alternative 1, consider the probability of choosing alternative 1 in period t+ 1:
P 1t+1 =
ev
1
t+1∑J
k=1 e
vkt+1
(A.2)
Now, take the log of both sides:
log(P 1t+1) = v
1
t+1 − log(
J∑
k=1
ev
k
t+1) (A.3)
1Individual subscripts are suppressed for simplicity.
94
Table A.1: Summary statistics by year for individuals observed every period
(N = 5, 385)
Year
1997 1998 1999
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Ever smoked 0.373 0.484 0.473 0.499 0.532 0.499
Current smoker 0.164 0.370 0.239 0.427 0.279 0.448
# of cigs/day 0.560 2.572 1.274 4.566 1.674 5.137
Age 14.23 1.472 15.87 1.430 16.84 1.439
Employed 0.441 0.497 0.501 0.500 0.522 0.500
Income 243.5 749.5 626.3 1,720 1,189 3,168
Married 0.000 0.019 0.004 0.064 0.013 0.112
2000 2001 2002
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Ever smoked 0.579 0.494 0.618 0.486 0.648 0.478
Current smoker 0.316 0.465 0.335 0.472 0.361 0.480
# of cigs/day 2.122 5.616 2.451 6.168 2.703 6.535
Age 17.91 1.435 18.90 1.427 19.90 1.402
Employed 0.611 0.488 0.697 0.459 0.750 0.433
Income 2,191 4,565 3,785 6,281 4,877 7,702
Married 0.026 0.159 0.052 0.222 0.074 0.262
2003 2004 2005
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Ever smoked 0.697 0.460 0.668 0.471 0.684 0.465
Current smoker 0.350 0.477 0.361 0.480 0.357 0.479
# of cigs/day 2.936 7.019 2.772 6.349 2.880 6.631
Age 22.85 1.420 20.85 1.424 21.88 1.418
Employed 0.830 0.376 0.785 0.411 0.804 0.397
Income 10,832 13,255 6,327 8,995 8,485 11,807
Married 0.108 0.310 0.143 0.350 0.182 0.386
2006 2007 2008
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Ever smoked 0.709 0.454 0.717 0.450 0.722 0.448
Current smoker 0.354 0.478 0.343 0.475 0.328 0.470
# of cigs/day 2.818 6.462 2.740 6.488 2.760 6.827
Age 23.81 1.420 24.77 1.432 25.78 1.426
Employed 0.854 0.353 0.870 0.336 0.867 0.340
Income 14,024 15,555 17,402 18,905 20,711 20,735
Married 0.217 0.412 0.248 0.432 0.277 0.447
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Substituting the log-sum term into the future value term gives the CCP representation of the future
value term:
Et[max
j
vjt+1] = u
1
t+1 + EVt+2 − log(P 1t+1) + e.c. (A.4)
When forming the choice probabilities in the likelihood function, all that matters is the difference
in conditional value functions. Finite dependence occurs when two sequences of choices lead to the
same future state in expectation. Then when taking the difference in conditional value functions, the
remaining future value terms in the CCP representation cancel. The state variables are the individuals
beliefs and the prior period’s decision. The expectation in the current period of future mean priors
is simply the mean of the current period priors for any future sequence of signals (i.e., Et[mt+k] =
mt, ∀k and ∪j {djt+1, . . . , djt+k−1}). The variance of the priors only depends on the number and
intensity of the signals; the timing of the signals does not matter. So the expected distribution of a
future period’s beliefs will be the same along any two sequences that generate the same number and
intensity of the signals. The other state variable is the prior period’s decision, which will be the same
as long as the two sequences end with the same alternative. The following table gives the sequences
that generate finite dependence.
period t− 1 t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3
sequence 1 0 aj 0 0
sequence 2 0 0 aj 0
For any aj > 0
sequence 1 aj′ aj 1 aj′ 0
sequence 2 aj′ 0 aj′ aj 0
For any aj, aj′ > 0
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Consider the simpler case, which is when the individual did not smoke in the prior period. The
conditional value function in period t for any alternative j > 1 and j = 1 are:
vj(d1t−1 = 1,Γt) = u
j(mt) + β ∗ E[V (Γt+1|djt = 1)]
v1(d1t−1 = 1,Γt) = β ∗ E[V (Γt+1)|d1t = 1]
(A.5)
The CCP representation of the future value term in the conditional value function for alternative
j > 1 is:
E[V (Γt+1|djt = 1)] = u1(E[mt+1|djt = 1])− Em[log(P 1(mt+1|djt = 1))]
+ βu1(E[mt+2|djt = 1, d1t+1 = 1])− βEm[log(P 1(mt+2|djt = 1, d1t+1 = 1))]
+ β2E[V (Γt+3|djt = 1, d1t+1 = 1, d1t+2 = 1)] (A.6)
and the CCP representation of the future value term in the conditional value function for alternative
j = 1 is:
E[V (Γt+1)|d1t = 1] = uj(E[mt+1|d1t = 1])− Em[log(P j(mt+1|d1t = 1))]
+ βu1(E[mt+2|d1t = 1, djt+1 = 1])− βEm[log(P 1(mt+2|d1t = 1, djt+1 = 1))]
+ β2E[V (Γt+3|d1t = 1, djt+1 = 1, d1t+2 = 1)] (A.7)
When calculating the choice probability in the likelihood function, all that matters is the difference
between these conditional value functions. The t + 3 expected future value term is the same for the
alternative j > 1 and j = 1 conditional value functions, so it will cancel out in the difference term.
All that remains are the flow utilities for periods t, t + 1, and t + 2 as well as CCPs for periods
t + 1 and t + 2. Note that the CCPs are functions of the mean prior beliefs (m), which depend on
the realized value of the signal. If no signal is received, then the CCP can be evaluated using the
current period beliefs. If, however, a signal is received, then calculating the expectation requires
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integrating over possible realizations of the signal. Approximating these integrals numerically adds
to the computational burden of the estimation procedure, but the computational requirements are
much less than would be needed to fully solve the dynamic learning problem.
An additional advantage of the CCP representation of the value function with finite dependence
is that it is not necessary to estimate a separate closing function for the value function in the final
period that the individuals are observed, which is the case when solving for the value function using
backwards recursion.
The experimentation decision is an optimal stopping problem, which is one of the original class
of problems where the CCP representation was applied. The conditional value function of experi-
menting is:
vEt = u
E
t + Et[Vt|dEt = 1] (A.8)
In periods after the individual experiments, he no longer faces an experimentation decision. So,
the conditional value function for experimenting does not include a future value term for future
experimentation decisions. The expectation over the value of the consumption decision is over the
iid preference shock as well as potential realizations of the value of α. The conditional value function
for not experimenting is the discounted expected value of the next period’s experimentation decision.
The CCP representation of this future value term is:
vNEn,t = βEt[V
E
n,t+1] (A.9)
= βEt[vEn,t+1 − log(PEn,t+1) + ec]
= βEt[uEn,t+1 + Et+1[Vn,t+1|dEn,t+1 = 1]− log(PEn,t+1) + ec]
Note that the CCP representation does not contain a future value term for the experimentation de-
cision for period t + 2. Now both conditional value functions contain an expected value of the
consumption decision in the period that the individual experiments. The expected value of the con-
sumption decision in the conditional value function for experimenting can be expressed as a function
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of the CCP of not smoking and the conditional value function of not smoking:
Et[Vn,t|dEn,t = 1] = Et[u1n,t + βEt[Vn,t+1|d1n,t = 1]− log(P 1n,t) + ec] (A.10)
The future value term will cancel with the future expected value of the consumption decision in
the conditional value function of not experimenting. Then the difference in the conditional value
functions of not experimenting and experimenting is:
vNEn,t − vEn,t = −uEn,t + E[log(P 1n,t)]− ec+ β(uEn,t − E[log(PEn,t)] + ec) (A.11)
The probability that an individual experiments is:
PEn,t =
1
1 + exp(vNEn,t − vEn,t)
(A.12)
A.2.2 Estimation Procedure
This section describes the details of the estimation procedure. The estimation procedure uses
the EM algorithm to estimate the parameters that maximize the likelihood function (equation 1.20).
The integrals in the likelihood function are approximated numerically, so the likelihood function
becomes a simulated likelihood function in estimation.2 The procedure begins with initial guesses
for the parameters and the CCPs as well asM vectors of draws from the standard normal distribution
for each individual, {zmn }Mm=1. These draws are used to form a sample ofN∗M simulated individuals.
Each iteration proceeds according to the following steps:
1. Calculate the value of the unobserved state variables for each individual using the current esti-
mates of the population distribution parameters and theM draws using the following equations
2When the EM algorithm is used to maximize a simulated expectation (the likelihood being maximized is the expected
conditional likelihood), it is called a simulated EM (SEM) algorithm.
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and the corresponding elements of the vector z:
θmn = θ¯ + Ch
′ ∗ zmn (A.13)
{λmn,t}Tt=1 = σλ ∗ zmn , {ψmn,t}Tt=1 = σψ ∗ zmn , and {ηn,t}Tt=1 = ση ∗ zmn (A.14)
where Ch is the Cholesky decomposition of Σ. These values of the addictive parameters and
the noisy component of the signals are used to calculate the individual’s prior beliefs for each
period.
2. E step, part 1: Use the prior iteration parameter values and CCPs, denoted Pˆ , to update pi:
pi(θmn ,Λ
m
n ) =
∏
t Ln,t(θ
m
n ,Λ
m
n , Pˆ )∑
m
∏
t Ln,t(θ
m
n ,Λ
m
n , Pˆ )
(A.15)
3. E step, part 2: Use the updated values of pi to update the CCPs. There are several methods for
updating the CCPs. The method used in this paper is to estimate a weighted multinomial logit
model of the observed choices on a flexible polynomial of the state variables (both observed
and unobserved), where the values of pi are the weights. The coefficients from this multinomial
logit are used in order to approximate the CCPs at the relevant combinations of state variables
in the solution to the individual’s problem. This method for updating the CCPs is analogous to
least squares value function interpolation. The only heterogeneity in utility from experimenta-
tion is in observable characteristics. Therefore, the CCPs for the experimentation decision can
be estimated outside of the main estimation routine. Similarly, state transition probabilities
that do not depend on the unobserved heterogeneity, or that only depend on the unobserved
heterogeneity through the smoking choice, can also be estimated in a first stage.
100
4. M step: Using the updated CCPs and pi, the parameters are updated by maximizing the simu-
lated log-likelihood function:
L˜ (γ, ξ, σ2ψ, σ
2
λ, σ
2
η, θ¯,Σ) =∑
n
1
M
∑
m
pi(θmn ,Λ
m
n )L (θ
m
n ,Λ
m
n , Pˆ , γ, ξ|σ2ψσ2λ, σ2η, θ¯,Σ) (A.16)
The parameters of the population distribution of unobserved heterogeneity can be estimated
separately and have a closed form solution (Train 2007). The updated parameters are simply
the weighted mean (for θ¯) and variance (for Σ, σ2λ, and σ
2
η) of the values of θ
m
n and Λ
m
n , where
the weights are the values of pi. The remaining parameters are estimated using simulated
maximum likelihood.
These steps are repeated until the parameters converge. The criteria for convergence can either be
based on changes in the parameter values or changes in the likelihood function. In practice, there
are a wide range of criteria used to determine the convergence of the SEM algorithm. Also, the
algorithm may not converge to the global maximum, so to confirm any potential maximum, the al-
gorithm must be rerun using different starting values. The convergence criteria used for preliminary
estimation results are that the parameters change by less than one half of one percent, which is the
criteria suggested by Train (2007). A feature of the EM algorithm is that the likelihood function
weakly increases from one iteration to the next. Performing the full maximization in the M-step
yields the largest possible increase in the likelihood but may be computationally intensive. The com-
putational burden is particularly great if an the derivative and Hessian must be approximated using
finite differences. In order to reduce the computational burden, I use an alternative version of the EM
algorithm. This alternative version of the EM algorithm replaces the full optimization of the M-step,
which gives the greatest possible likelihood improvement, with a procedure that is simply guaranteed
to improve the likelihood function. This version of the EM algorithm is called a Generalized EM
algorithm (GEM) and is commonly implemented by replacing the maximization in the M-step with
a single Newton-Raphson iteration. GEM algorithms share similar convergence properties as the
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EM algorithm, although they converge at a slower rate. Even though GEM algorithms require more
iterations to converge, each iteration requires much fewer evaluations of the likelihood function.
This estimation procedure is still computationally demanding, although standard procedures
would likely be infeasible.3 Evaluating the likelihood for a single simulated individual only takes
a fraction of a second, but with N ∗M simulated individuals, a single evaluation of the likelihood
function can take hours.4
3Using Simulated Maximum Likelihood to estimate the version of the model without learning took around 12 hours
for a modest number of draws.
4There are two factors that influence the number of calculations needed to evaluate the likelihood function for a single
simulated individual. The most significant determinant of the number of necessary calculations is the number of draws
used to approximate the future value terms. Increasing the number of draws by a given factor increases estimation time
by nearly the same factor. The second determinant of estimation time is the number of terms used in the interpolation of
the CCPs. Increasing the number of terms by using a higher order polynomial approximation increases the calculations
needed to evaluate the likelihood function. However, the most significant effect of increasing the number of interpolation
terms comes in the increase in the time it takes to update the CCPs.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR DO CONSUMERS’ BELIEFS CONVERGE TO EMPIRICAL
DISTRIBUTIONS WITH REPEATED PURCHASES?
B.1 Data Appendix
B.1.1 Online Questionnaire Data
Individuals who participated in the online questionnaire were respondents from a list of emails
generated through participation in a separate online questionnaire conducted at UNC during the
2011-2012 and 2012-2013 academic calendar years. These individuals agreed to participate in
follow-up surveys at the completion of the separate questionnaire. This separate questionnaire was
distributed by instructors to their students, who had the option to participate. Additional details about
this separate questionnaire are available in Spence (2013).
Online Questionnaire
[The following is a subset of the questions provided to textbook consumers using Qualtrics online survey
software. Notes are provided in brackets.]
Textbook Purchasing Questionnaire
The following survey seeks to gain understanding into how consumers choose which retailers to consider
when faced with purchasing decisions. Over the course of this survey you will be presented with a number
of hypothetical textbook purchasing decisions. You will be asked about your price expectations from online
retailers and your beliefs about the time costs involved with searching within an online market. You will not
actually have to price any textbooks from online retailers or visit any website outside of this survey.
Directions: Please answer all questions to the best of your ability. Use the right arrow button at the bottom of
the screen to advance to the next page. You may also use the left arrow at the bottom of the screen to move
back at any time and change a previous answer. If you are uncomfortable answering a specific question you
can either skip that question or exit the survey. Thank you for participating!
How many semesters in total, including this one, have you attended UNC and any other college? (Count a
summer session as a semester)
Semesters:
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What is (are) your major(s)? Please write Undecided if you do not currently have a stated major.
Major(s):
Which of the following have you ever purchased a textbook from? (Please check all that apply)
 UNC Student Stores (campus bookstore)
 Ram Book and Supply
 Another college bookstore
 Amazon.com
 Half.com or Ebay.com
 Ecampus.com
 Chegg.com
 Another online retailer
 Another student (directly)
Which of the following have you ever rented a textbook from? (Please check all that apply)
 I have never rented a textbook
 UNC Student Stores (campus bookstore)
 Ram Book and Supply
 Another college bookstore
 Amazon.com
 Half.com or Ebay.com
 Ecampus.com
 Chegg.com
 Another online retailer
 Another student (directly)
Please write in the other online retailers you have ever rented or purchased a textbook from:
When do you normally purchase (or order) your textbooks?
More than 2 weeks before the semester starts
 1 - 2 weeks before the semester starts
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 A few days before the semester starts
 The day the semester starts
 A few days after the semester starts
 1 - 2 weeks after the semester starts
More than 2 weeks after the semester starts
Have you purchased or rented any textbooks for an upcoming summer session?
 Yes
 No
How many textbooks have you ever purchased or rented online?
 1 - 5
 6 - 10
 11 or more
When purchasing or renting a textbook online, have you ever used a website that shows the lowest prices
available from multiple online retailers?
 Yes
 No
On average, when you purchase a textbook online, how many different online retailers do you visit? Number
of Retailers Visited:
Do you have an Amazon Prime membership?
 Yes
 No
Do you have a Paypal account?
 Yes
 No
How many online purchases do you typically make in a three month period?
Number of Purchases:
If you were given an isbn number or textbook title and wanted to purchase or rent this textbook online, what
105
is the first website you would visit?
Website Name:
Hypothetically, if you only visited one online retailer, how many minutes do you think it would take to look up
one textbook and purchase it? (Include the time to search, find the option you want, enter your information,
and complete the transaction)
Minutes:
Hypothetically, if you only visited one online retailer, how many minutes do you think it would take to look
up three textbooks and purchase them? (Include the time to search, find the option you want, enter your
information, and complete the transaction)
Minutes:
You will now be given a number of hypothetical textbook purchasing decisions. In each case, you will be
given information about the textbook and asked to give your best guess about what the price of this textbook
is from an online retailer. This survey is concerned about what your expectations are about prices from online
retailers, so please do not actually search for the price of the textbook online. Before presenting you with the
hypothetical purchasing decisions, you will be provided with an example of what the questions will be like.
Example: If you searched only one clothing store in the mall (ex. Old Navy), what do you think is the lowest
price you could find for a pair of jeans in your size? Please enter your answer as a number. Note that this
question does not have a right or wrong answer, it simply asks for your best guess.
$ [Denoted “Example Expectation” in following questions]
Example Continued: Given that you dont know the lowest price of a pair of jeans with certainty, there is some
chance that the lowest price is lower than $[Example Expectation] and some chance that the lowest price is
greater than $[Example Expectation]. In the following questions, you will be asked about your beliefs about
the chance that the lowest price you could find would be below $[Example Expectation] and also the chance
the lowest price you could find would be above $[Example Expectation].
What do you think is the chance that the lowest price of the pair of jeans is less than $[90% of Example
Expectation]? Please enter the chance as a percentage (i.e. a number between 0 and 100). For example: I think
there is a 30% chance that the lowest price of the pair of jeans is less than $[90% of Example Expectation];
Percent Chance:
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What do you think is the chance that the lowest price of the pair of jeans is more than $[110% of Example
Expectation]? Please enter the chance as a percentage (i.e. a number between 0 and 100). For example: “I
think there is a 35% chance that the lowest price of the pair of jeans is greater than $[Example Expectation].”
Percent Chance:
You will now be given three textbook purchasing scenarios, each similar to the previous example.
[The following is an example using one of the possible twelve textbooks. Respondents were given three
scenarios randomly drawn from three groups of four textbooks (one from each group).]
Scenario: You are assigned “Economics: Principles and Policy” by William Baumol and Alan Blinder for
an introductory economics course (ECON-101). [The following information on textbook characteristics was
randomly assigned to respondents with 50% likelihood. The likelihood of receiving this information for the
subsequent scenarios did not depend on whether the information on characteristics was shown for previous
textbook purchasing scenarios.] This is the twelfth and latest edition of the textbook, it was published by
South-Western College Publishing, and was last revised in 2012. The dimensions of the book are 8.4 x 1.5 x
11.1 inches, it is a hardcover, it contains 880 pages, and it weighs 4.4 pounds. A picture is provided below:
[Picture presented such as the one shown in the screenshot in Section 3]
Have you ever taken this course?
 Yes
 No
Have you ever been assigned this textbook?
 Yes
 No
You know that a new copy of this book costs $212 (including taxes) at the UNC Student Stores. If you searched
one online retailer, what do you think the price of a new copy at this online retailer would be (include shipping
costs)? Reminder: Please do not actually search for this price. Provide your best guess instead.
$ [Denoted “New Expectation” in future questions]
What do you think is the probability that the lowest price for a new copy of this book is less than $[85%, 90%,
or 95% of New Expectation] (including shipping costs) at the online retailer?
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Percent Chance:
What do you think is the probability that the lowest price for a new copy of this book costs more than $[105%,
110%, or 115% of New Expectation] (including shipping costs) at the online retailer? Note that your answer
to this question added to your answer from the previous question should not exceed 100.
Percent Chance:
You know that a used copy of this book costs $159 (including taxes) at the UNC Student Stores. If you searched
one online retailer, what do you think the price of a used copy at this online retailer would be (include shipping
costs)?
$ [Denoted “Used Expectation” in future questions]
What do you think is the probability that the lowest price for a used copy of this book costs less than $[85%,
90%, or 95% of Used Expectation] (including shipping costs) at the online retailer?
Percent Chance:
What do you think is the probability that the lowest price for a used copy of this book costs more than $[105%,
110%, or 115% of Used Expectation] (including shipping costs) at the online retailer? Note that your answer
to this question added to your answer from the previous question should not exceed 100.
Percent Chance:
B.1.2 Textbook Purchasing Scenarios
Table B.1 provides information on the textbooks used in the hypothetical textbook purchasing sce-
narios. Respondents that completed the survey faced three scenarios; in each scenario, one textbook
from each group was randomly assigned to the respondent. The first group is composed of social
science textbooks; the second group is composed of hard science textbooks; the third group is com-
posed of humanities textbooks. In the Fall 2012 semester, individuals were presented these scenarios
in the previous ordering (social sciences, hard sciences, then humanities). The Spring 2013 ques-
tionnaire assigned individuals to groups at random (i.e. roughly one third of respondents completed
a scenario with a hard sciences textbook, then social sciences, then humanities).
Textbooks were chosen to provide variation in the following characteristics: the number of total
editions of the textbook, whether the textbook is the latest edition, the year of publication, whether
the course was designed for an introductory or upper-level course, the type of cover (hardback vs.
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paperback), the number of pages, and the weight. In the following tables, course number refers to
the numbering at UNC for the Fall 2012 and Spring 2013 semesters. New bookstore price refers to
the price from UNC’s campus bookstore during these semesters.
B.1.3 Survey Attrition and Estimation Sample
Table B.2 summarizes the number of respondents at various points within the survey. For the Fall
2012 semester, 979 respondents began the questionnaire and 734 (75%) completed the questionnaire.
For the Spring 2013 semester, 1002 respondents began the questionnaire and 703 (70%) completed
the questionnaire. We only exclude individuals who did not complete the background questions. This
leaves 820 respondents from the Fall and 798 respondents from the Spring. Of these individuals, we
exclude 104 respondents (52 from both semesters) because they had been enrolled in college for
more than 10 semesters and/or summer sessions and an additional 49 respondents (29 from Fall
2012 and 20 from Spring 2013) for reporting nonsensical answers (e.g., reporting an expected price
of $100,000).
Table B.2: Survey Attrition
Fall 2012 Percent Spring 2013 Percent
Respondents Remaining Respondents Remaining
Began the questionnaire 979 100 1002 100
Completed the background questions 820 83.8 798 79.6
Completed at least one scenario 759 77.5 761 75.9
Completed at least two scenarios 741 75.7 716 71.5
Completed the questionnaire 734 75.0 703 70.2
B.2 Robustness Checks
This section investigates the robustness of the results presented in the paper by providing results
from a number of other specifications. Explicitly, we explore the robustness of our results by varying
the following:
B.2.1 The criteria for begin omitted from the sample and the number of scenarios used for each
respondent.
B.2.2 Testing the distributional assumption.
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Table B.3: Results Using Alternative Samples
Used Books
Main Sample Extended Sample Single Scenario
Experience N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD
No Online Purchases 438 0.739 0.201 450 0.732 0.211 151 0.736 0.209
1-5 Online Purchases 917 0.712 0.181 939 0.709 0.189 311 0.700 0.190
6-10 Online Purchases 957 0.683 0.173 976 0.677 0.181 324 0.674 0.181
11+ Online Purchases 1698 0.653 0.180 1755 0.647 0.191 577 0.638 0.186
New Books
Main Sample Extended Sample Single Scenario
Experience N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD
No Online Purchases 440 0.833 0.172 452 0.832 0.186 152 0.828 0.177
1-5 Online Purchases 923 0.819 0.153 945 0.814 0.161 313 0.804 0.166
6-10 Online Purchases 966 0.783 0.161 985 0.779 0.165 326 0.761 0.176
11+ Online Purchases 1706 0.770 0.157 1763 0.768 0.166 581 0.752 0.168
B.2.1 Omission Criteria
Respondents are omitted from our sample in the main body of the paper for two reasons:
1. Being enrolled in more than 10 semesters of college.
2. Reporting expectations less than 10% of the bookstore price or greater than 150% of the book-
store price.
The first criteria is used to focus on traditional college students. The second criteria is used to
eliminate respondents who we believe did not take the questionnaire seriously (for example, indi-
viduals who reported expectations of $0 or $100,000). To make sure that our results are not biased
because of these omissions, we relax the second omission criteria. We also report evidence that our
omission criteria is not correlated with our measures of experience.
We proceed to report the main findings from the paper for a less stringent omission criteria.
Specifically, we only omit respondents who report expectations less than 1% of the bookstore price
or greater than 200% of the bookstore price. This results in four respondents being omitted from
the Fall sample and one respondent being omitted from the Spring sample for reporting expectations
below 1% of the bookstore price, and four respondents being omitted from the Fall sample and four
respondents being omitted from the Spring sample for reporting expectations greater than 200% of
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Table B.4: Distribution Results
Used New
Experience N mean Ei(p) mean
√
Vari(p) N mean Ei(p) mean
√
Vari(p)
Normal
No online purchases 291 0.720*** (0.159) 0.126 (0.096) 300 0.837*** (0.134) 0.139 (0.099)
1-5 online purchases 619 0.714*** (0.155) 0.130* (0.094) 662 0.822*** (0.129**) 0.141* (0.096)
6-10 online purchases 667 0.701* (0.150***) 0.125 (0.095) 696 0.796 (0.130) 0.130 (0.088*)
11+ online purchases 1202 0.669*** (0.160***) 0.119** (0.089) 1259 0.784*** (0.134*) 0.133 (0.096)
Gamma
No online purchases 411 0.747*** (0.192) 0.219 (0.281) 412 0.836*** (0.164) 0.237 (0.288)
1-5 online purchases 852 0.717*** (0.175) 0.244** (0.294**) 870 0.819*** (0.152*) 0.243* (0.312)
6-10 online purchases 900 0.689 (0.170***) 0.234 (0.292) 908 0.785* (0.158) 0.224 (0.276)
11+ online purchases 1601 0.656*** (0.174) 0.207*** (0.252***) 1604 0.774*** (0.153) 0.217* (0.269)
Log-Normal - Restricted Sample
No online purchases 283 0.726*** (0.158) 0.113 (0.068) 299 0.836*** (0.135) 0.129 (0.074***)
1-5 online purchases 610 0.715*** (0.156) 0.116*** (0.067**) 649 0.822*** (0.126***) 0.131*** (0.071)
6-10 online purchases 647 0.701* (0.151***) 0.110 (0.063) 678 0.797 (0.128) 0.121 (0.065**)
11+ online purchases 1168 0.665*** (0.161***) 0.104*** (0.060**) 1218 0.783*** (0.134**) 0.121* (0.068)
Gamma - Restricted Sample
No online purchases 317 0.754*** (0.197) 0.108 (0.060) 325 0.847*** (0.164) 0.126** (0.072***)
1-5 online purchases 637 0.715*** (0.174) 0.112*** (0.064**) 690 0.821*** (0.151*) 0.125*** (0.070**)
6-10 online purchases 676 0.694 (0.166***) 0.107 (0.063) 708 0.788** (0.153) 0.114* (0.063**)
11+ online purchases 1210 0.660*** (0.174) 0.101*** (0.059**) 1263 0.780*** (0.150) 0.114*** (0.063**)
Notes: Standard deviations in parenthesis.
The significance levels reported for the mean values are from a two-sample equality of means test. The significance levels
for the standard deviations are from Brown and Forsythe’s alternative formulation of Levene’s robust two-sample equality of
variances test.
* refers to p–value < .1; ** < .05; *** < .01
the bookstore price.
Table B.3 reports the mean ratio of expectations to bookstore prices for the main sample as
well as the extended sample. Including outliers does not significantly change the estimates of mean
price expectations. Also included in table B.3 are the results that only use the first hypothetical
textbook purchasing scenario that an individual responded to (out of a potential of six for individuals
who completed the questionnaire in the fall and spring semester). The price expectations for the
first scenario are lower than for the full sample, but the relationship between experience and price
expectations is the same for both groups.
Results from regressions of the ratio of expectations to bookstore prices on measures of experi-
ence and other covariates also remain quantitatively similar to the results reported in the main body
of the paper (not reported).
Table B.4 reports the results for the normal and gamma distributions. Also included are the
results for the log-normal and gamma distributions using a more restrictive sample. Since the normal
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distribution requires dropping individuals who report a greater than 50% probability of being below
the threshold, the restricted samples are constructed using a similar rejection criteria. The samples
are constructed by dropping individuals who report a 50% or greater probability of being below the
threshold. Then the parameter values are calculated for each individual, and the final sample includes
individuals whose parameter values are not in the top or bottom 2.5% of values for either parameter.
The results for the log-normal and gamma using the restricted samples does not change the mean of
the price expectations by a large amount, but the variability of the expected price distribution falls
substantially. With a similar sample construction, the normal distribution is closest to the variability
of the empirical distribution. The higher mean variability of the expected price distribution using the
less restrictive sample for the log-normal and gamma distributions is driven by the individuals who
report a high probability of the price being below the threshold. Ultimately, the results are similar
regardless of the distribution used.
B.2.2 Price Distribution
In this section we provide some evidence supporting the use of the log normal price distribution as
well as discussing some limitations of the distribution in fitting certain features of the empirical price
distribution. Tests for normality reject the assumption of normality for both the distribution of prices
and the log of prices for most specifications of the empirical distribution. For used books with a list
price greater than $100, the assumption of normality cannot be rejected. For new books, the normal
distribution is able to fit the data better than the log-normal distribution. For used books, the normal
distribution only fits better for the relatively expensive books. In order for the log normal distribution
to fit the long right tail of the price distribution, the result is that it places too little weight on the left
tail relative to the empirical distribution. The analysis in this paper is not dependent on a particular
distributional assumption. In structural search models, however, an incorrect distributional assump-
tion on the individual’s beliefs about the price distribution or about the empirical price distribution
can significantly bias estimates. Figure B.1 displays histograms of the empirical prices for the Fall
survey period. Figures B.2 and B.3 display kernel density estimates for used and new prices. Finally
figures B.5 and B.4 display the time series of the mean daily price with the 95% confidence interval.
During the survey periods, prices are relatively stable. Used prices rise considerably leading up to
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Figure B.1: Histograms of Prices
the start of the semester, however, new prices remain fairly stable throughout the year.
114
Figure B.2: Kernel Density Estimate
Figure B.3: Kernel Density Estimate
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Figure B.4: Daily Used Prices
Figure B.5: Daily New Prices
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